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A "Miracle" in Transition 
ONE  EAST  ASIAN  country after another has taken off  from a stagnant 
state to achieve an annual economic  growth rate of 10 percent or more. 
The  fact  that such  high  economic  growth  rates  are being  sustained, 
along  with observation  based on growth convergence  regressions  that 
prior economic  and social  conditions  do not seem  to have  warranted 
such rapid growth,  has led many to call the East Asian growth a mira- 
cle. ' 
However,  this is not the first time that an Asian country has grown 
miraculously fast. From the mid-1950s  until 1973,  Japan grew at a rate 
comparable  to  that of  the  East  Asian  economies  today.  And just  as 
concerns  are voiced  today that some  East Asian  economies  are over- 
heating and their governments face the difficult task of inducing a " soft- 
landing,"  a similar concern was heard in Japan three decades  ago. 
Japan's high  rate of  growth from the mid-1950s  through the early 
1970s was a topic explored by many studies at the time. Several authors 
believed  that Japan's economic  institutions  and policies  were unique, 
and that its growth was  an exception  to the rule.  In light of the rapid 
growth of the other East Asian economies  in recent years,  this earlier 
Japanese experience  is no longer  viewed  as exceptional.  The success 
of the East Asian economies  offers  fresh case  studies for development 
economics  and growth theory.  The World Bank study The East Asian 
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Miracle  is  one  of  the most  comprehensive  analyses  of  growth in the 
region.2 New  growth theory and growth convergence  regressions  have 
been applied to test for the sources of this growth. With scale economies 
in such models,  multiple equilibria are possible,  leading some to stress 
the importance of  a "big  push"-simultaneous  growth in many sec- 
tors-or  various government interventions in the growth process.  Such 
studies often emphasize  the importance of initial conditions,  including 
education,  other aspects of social  infrastructure, and political  stability. 
Rather than providing such a broad analysis based on growth theory, 
this paper looks  closely  at Japan's experience  and the lessons  it may 
provide.  In  the  early  postwar  decades,  Japan was  recording  annual 
growth  rates  of  around  10  percent,  and many  academic  and policy 
questions were related to how long high growth rates could be sustained. 
The high growth rates of the  1950s  and 1960s  were in part explained 
by Japan's  quick  recovery  of  the productive  potential  that had been 
destroyed during World War  II. However,  the economy  had surpassed 
its prewar potential trend by the beginning of the 1960s,  and it continued 
to grow rapidly throughout that decade  and into the beginning  of  the 
1970s.  Indeed,  at the height of the postwar miracle,  Japan's real GDP 
expanded four fold in fifteen years,  from 1958 to 1973. 
The  growth  trend of  the  1960s  slowed  abruptly after the  first oil 
crisis,  in 1973-74.  But although the annual growth rate over  1975-90 
was roughly  half of that achieved  in the previous two decades,  it still 
exceeded  4 percent.  Another interesting feature of this period was the 
sharp nominal  appreciation of  the yen: its value  tripled from  1970  to 
1995.  Largely due to this currency appreciation,  per capita GDP,  de- 
nominated in U.S.  dollars at the market exchange  rate, had overtaken 
that of the United States by the late 1980s.  Already by the mid-1980s, 
many observers  were noting that the Japanese economy  had matured, 
with per capita income  approaching that of the leading industrial econ- 
omies  and growth  slowing  to approach rates in the leading  industrial 
economies.  Market forces,  especially  the sharp appreciation of the yen, 
had forced rapid structural changes  in industry. Some  special  features 
of the Japanese economy,  including  some regulatory measures,  disap- 
peared, although others persisted.  During the second half of the 1980s, 
the economy  experienced  a large  speculative  bubble  in  asset  prices, 
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which then burst in the first half of the 1990s.  The growth rate did not 
rise above  1 percent between  1992 and 1995. 
Today, the Japanese economy  merits research for two reasons. First, 
because  the economy  is taking much longer than expected  to recover 
from the burst bubble,  economists  and policymakers  in Japan are un- 
certain about the future growth of the economy.  Second,  as some of the 
East Asian  economies  are sustaining  growth  at rates that once  were 
achieved  by Japan, it is useful to look for similarities  among them and 
lessons  that can be learned. Here I address both of these issues.  Using 
time-series  data extending  back  more  than a century,  I first review 
different stages of Japanese economic  development.  Difficulties  as well 
as successes  are summarized, with particular emphasis on the problems 
of the  1990s  and how they may be overcome.  I then note some  of the 
similarities and differences  between the Japanese economy  and the East 
Asian economies  whose  growth rates in the 1980s  and 1990s rival the 
records set by Japan during the 1960s and 1970s.  Finally,  I draw some 
lessons  for the East Asian  economies,  focusing  especially  on whether 
some  of  the difficulties  that Japan has faced  in the  1990s  and earlier 
can be avoided  by East Asian economies  in the future. 
Japanese Economic Development: A Long-Run View 
The  high  economic  growth  rates of  the  1960s  and early  1970s  in 
Japan stimulated  much study at the time.3 Here,  I start with a longer 
view of Japanese economic  development based on time-series  data from 
1880 to the present.  Figure  1 shows  the time series of real GDP from 
1880 to  1995,  and table  1 gives  average growth rates for various sub- 
periods.  The Japanese economy  expanded at an average annual rate of 
about 3 percent for more than a half century before the Second World 
War. This long period of sustained growth was accompanied  by rapid 
structural change  from an agrarian to an industrialized  economy.  The 
3.  Representative  examples from the 1970s include Ohkawa  and Rosovsky (1973), 
Patrick  and Rosovsky (1976), Denison and Chung (1976a, 1976b), and Ohkawa  and 
Shinohara  (1979). Long-term  statistics for various sectors, as well as aggregate  varia- 
bles, are collected in the fourteen volume series Estimates of Long-Term  Economic 
Statistics  of Japan  since  1868,  published  between  1965  and  1990  under the  general 
editorship  of Kazushi  Ohkawa,  Miyohei Shinohara,  and Mataji  Umemura. 208  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
Figure 1. Real GDP,  Japan, 1880-1995a 
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Source: Author's  calculations.  Data for 1880-85 are from Fujino (1975); for 1886-1940, from Ohkawa  and Shinohara  (1979); 
for  1941-55,  from Ohkawa, Takamatsu,  and Yamamoto (1974); and for  1956-95,  from Japan, Economic Planning Agency 
(various  years) (available  on CD-ROM  for 1996). 
a. Prewar  data  are for GNP. 
postwar economic  achievement  should be understood against this back- 
ground. As productive resources were either diverted to military use or 
destroyed in war, real output fell by half from 1944 to 1946.  Recovery 
was  quick,  however.  By  the mid-1950s,  GDP  had regained  its  1943 
level,  and by  1960,  it was  at the level  predicted by its prewar trend. 
The following  ten to fifteen years of high economic  growth, in essence, 
represent the Japanese  "miracle.'"  This  terminology  stems  from  the 
fact that economists,  using  a Solow  growth model  and analyzing  total 
factor productivity,  could  not explain  the  large  Solow  residuals  that 
they found.4 
4.  See, for example, Denison and Chung  (1976a, 1976b). Takatoshi  Ito  209 
Table 1. Real GDP Growth, Japan and the United States, Selected Subperiodsa 
Annual  percentage  rate 
Subperiod  Japan  United States 
1890-1905  2.65  3.86 
1905-20  3.49  2.85 
1920-35  3.18  1.29 
1946-60  9.38  3.45 
1960-75  8.26  3.81 
1975-90  4.12  2.96 
1990-95  1.28  1.89 
Source: Author's calculations.  Data on Japan for 1880-85  are from Fujino (1975); for  1886-1935,  from Ohkawa and 
Shinohara (1979);  for 1946-55,  from Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974); for 1956-95,  from Japan, Economic 
Planning Agency  (various years) (available on CD-ROM for  1996).  Data on the United States are from Friedman and 
Schwartz ( 1982) and the Economic Report of the President,  1996. 
a. Prewar growth rates are for GNP growth. 
Economists  have debated possible  reasons for the abrupt downward 
shift in the growth rate in 1973-74.  Aside  from the obvious  argument 
that the  Japanese  economy  must  have  converged  to  other  industrial 
economies  and that therefore opportunities for high-return investment 
had been exhausted,  other factors,  such as higher oil prices,  pollution 
prevention  regulations,  and the appreciation of the yen,  were consid- 
ered. To the extent that the explanation of the high growth rates before 
1973  was  attributed to the model's  residuals,  the  slowdown  was  not 
explained.  That the slowdown  was unexpected,  and was not recognized 
for a long  time,  is  clearly  reflected  in the fact that while  the govern- 
ment' s five-year target forecasts of growth rates had always been under- 
estimates before 1973, they were overestimates  from 1975 until the late 
1980s.5 Japanese growth rates seem to have shifted downward again in 
the first half of the 1990s,  a period investigated  more fully  below. 
Real  appreciation  of  the  yen  has  been  a distinctive  feature  of  the 
Japanese economy  in the postwar period.  Figure 2 shows  the behavior 
of  the real exchange  rate,  defined  as dollars to yen  (the reciprocal  of 
the yen-dollar  rate) multiplied  by the ratio of  the Japanese consumer 
price index  (CPI) to the U.S.  CPI.  Figure 3 presents Japan's relative 
per capita growth performance (that is,  the Japanese per capita growth 
rate less  the  U.S.  rate)  and real  exchange  rate behavior  for  various 
subperiods before  and after World War II.  During each postwar  sub- 
5.  See Ito (1992, pp. 66-67).  The government's  failure  to recognize  the downward 
shift in trend  growth  rates was a contributory  factor of the excessive fiscal stimulus in 
the second  half of the 1970s;  see Ito (1992, ch. 6) and  Asako, Ito, and  Sakamoto  (1991). 210  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
Figure  2. Real Exchange  Rate of the Yen, 1879-1995a 
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Source: Author's  calculations. Data on the nominal exchange rate for 1879-1940 are from Yamazawa  and Yamamoto  (1979); 
for 1949-70, the Bretton  Woods rate of 360; and for 1971-95, average  of daily closing rates reported  in Toyo Kezai Shimposha 
(1996). Data on consumer price indexes are from Ohkawa and others (1966); Japan, Management  and Coordination  Agency 
(1996); the Econiomnic  Report  of the Presidenit,  1996; and provided  directly  by the National  Bureau  of Economic Research. 
a. Throughout  the paper,  the real exchange rate of a country's  currency  is defined as the price of the local currency  in dollars 
multiplied  by the ratio  of the local CPI to the U.S. CPI. 
b. Figure  plots the natural  log of an index that  is constructed  so that 1990 = 1. 
period Japan experienced  both a higher per capita growth rate than the 
United States and a real currency appreciation. Accordingly,  these post- 
war subperiods are in the northeast quadrant of figure 3. This is consis- 
tent  with  the  Balassa-Samuelson  hypothesis,  which,  under  standard 
assumptions,  predicts  that rapid growth  will  be  positively  correlated 
with real appreciation.6 
However,  when all subperiods  are examined,  the positive  relation- 
6.  For a discussion of the Balassa-Samuelson  hypothesis  and  related  references,  see 
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Figure 3. Japanese  Real Exchange  Rate Changes  and Growth  Relative  to the United 
States, Selected  Subperiods 
Annual real exchange rate change (percent)a 
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Source:  Author's  calculations. For sources of GDP data,  see table l; and for exchange rate  data,  see figure  2. 
a. Calculated  as 100 x  average  annual  change in the natural  log of an index constructed  so that 1990 = 1. 
b. Per capita  GDP growth  rate:  Japan  less United States. Prewar  data are for per capita GNP. 
ship  between  Japan's  relative  growth rate and its real exchange  rate 
appreciation  disappears.  For the  prewar  period,  although  Japan's 
growth rate was higher than that of the United States, the real exchange 
rate depreciated,  on average, in two of the three subperiods. Taking the 
three prewar subperiods  and the three postwar subperiods  separately, 
each shows,  if anything,  a negative  relationship between relative Jap- 
anese growth and the real appreciation of the yen. Indeed, in the prewar 
period,  the subperiod with the fastest  relative  growth (1920-38)  also 
experienced  the largest depreciation  of the real exchange  rate; and in 
the  postwar  period,  the  subperiod  with  the  fastest  relative  growth 
(1950-70)  had the least appreciation. 
Rapid structural change in industry may provide a clue to understand- 
ing this relationship between  growth and exchange  rate behavior.  The 
prewar Japanese economy  was  heavily  dominated  by the agricultural 
sector.  In 1885 the agricultural sector (including  forestry and fishing) 
accounted  for  about 40  percent  of  net  domestic  product,  while  the 212  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
Table 2.  Productivity  Growth  and Inflation,  by Sector, Japan and the United States, 
1960-92a 
Annual percentage rate 
Japan  United States 
Productivity  Productivity 
Sector  growth  Inflation  growth  Inflation 
Tradable 
Total  6.86  2.96  2.85  3.23 
Agriculture  3.55  4.89  3.15  4.21 
Manufacturing  6.52  1.87  2.75  3.12 
Nontradable 
Total  3.79  5.20  0.65  5.03 
Energy and transportation  4.36  3.98  2.64  3.78 
Construction  2.77  6.89  -  1.53  6.94 
Distribution and finance  5.49  3.69  0.80  4.76 
Services  1.87  7.70  0.50  5.64 
Difference (tradable less nontradable)  3.07  -2.24  2.20  -  1.80 
Whole economy  5.29  4.27  1.32  4.50 
Source: Author's calculations based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nationial  Accoiunts, 
vol.  2, Detailed Tables (various years). 
a. Productivity growth in a given sector is the annual percentage change in the ratio of total production  to total employment 
for that sector. Inflation in a given sector is the annual percentage change in the CPI for that sector. 
manufacturing and mining sector explained  only 7 percent.  It was not 
until  1931 that the manufacturing and mining output exceeded  that of 
the agricultural sector.  During the gold  standard era (1897  to  1917), 
and also in the 1920s,  when policy  was directed to getting back on the 
gold  standard,  the  currency  was  overvalued  and growth  was  con- 
strained. Appreciation  during this period was not the result of produc- 
tivity  gains in the tradable sector,  but of deflationary policy  mandated 
by the gold standard. Japan finally abandoned its efforts to maintain the 
gold standard in 1931,  and its currency depreciated sharply, relative to 
that of the United  States,  the remaining major gold  standard country. 
The growth in the 1930s was helped by this depreciation and the asso- 
ciated boom in exports. 
Between  1955  and  1970,  manufacturing's  share of  GDP increased 
from 28 percent to 36 percent.  However,  by  1995,  the share of manu- 
facturing had declined  to less  than 25  percent.  Table  2 examines  the 
postwar period in greater detail,  showing  the changes in labor produc- Takatoshi  Ito  213 
tivity  and prices for major sectors of the Japanese economy  from 1960 
to  1992,  and comparing them with their U.S.  counterparts. 
This  breakdown  sheds  light  on  the  long-run  process  of  Japanese 
economic  growth and puts the yen exchange  rate movement in perspec- 
tive.  First, the primary source of Japan's rapid growth was clearly the 
high  rate of  productivity  growth  in the manufacturing sector  and the 
shift of resources to that sector.  Furthermore, the productivity growth 
rate of the tradable sector was higher than that of either the manufac- 
turing or the agricultural sector. This is because of a substantial relative 
shift of resources to manufacturing, where the level  of productivity has 
always been higher than in other sectors.  Second,  comparing each sec- 
tor's increase  in productivity  and prices,  the expected  negative  corre- 
lation between productivity growth and inflation is evident. Third, when 
Japan and the  United  States  are compared,  the  productivity  growth 
differentials  in tradables,  or manufacturing alone,  are large.  The cor- 
responding differences  in price changes are much smaller, and are small 
relative to movements  in the nominal exchange  rate. The difference  in 
nontradables  productivity  growth  is  also  substantial  and,  again,  the 
relative price movements are much smaller. However,  the relative mag- 
nitudes  of  the changes  in productivity  growth  and prices  support the 
notion that the real exchange  rate changes  are, at least in part, driven 
by the productivity  differentials. 
The Bubble and Its Collapse 
Asset prices,  most notably stock and land prices,  rose sharply in the 
second  half of the  1980s  and then declined  sharply in the first half of 
the  1990s.  These  two  periods represent,  respectively,  the bubble and 
its collapse.  As of the summer of  1996,  asset prices are at about their 
levels  before the onset of the bubble. However,  their roller coaster ride 
has left a long-lasting  scar on the Japanese economy,  in particular on 
the  balance  sheets  of  many  financial  institutions  and nonfinancial 
corporations. 
This section reviews the debate about what really happened and why, 
the consequences  of the bubble,  how the bubble could have been pre- 
vented,  and the challenge  to recovery  in the 1990s. 214  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
Figure 4. Land and Stock Prices, Japan, 1971-95a 
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Source: The land price index is the Japan Real Estate Institute's index of prices of all zoning classifications of land in 
Japan's six largest cities.  It is measured at the end of the first and third quarters. Second and fourth quarter  observations are 
interpolated. For stock prices,  the author calculates averages of daily closing  levels  of the Nikkei 225 stock price index, 
taken from Toyo Kezai Shinposha (various issues). 
a. Tic marks correspond to first quarter  of given years. 
What Happened? 
Movements  in  stock  and land prices  are shown  in figure 4.  Stock 
prices started their sharp rise in 1983 and increased until 1990.  Annual 
growth rates of  stock  prices  (measured  December  to  December)  ex- 
ceeded 20 percent in all but one year between  1983 and 1989.  In 1986, 
the return reached 44 percent.  Residential  land prices suddenly started 
to increase rapidly in  1986,  increasing  by 22 percent in that year and 
69  percent in  1987.  Typically,  housing  costs  almost  doubled  in two 
years. Commercial land prices in Tokyo had begun to rise earlier. Land Takatoshi  Ito  215 
prices in Osaka and other major cities  followed  those in Tokyo  with a 
lag of one to two years. 
Stock  prices  started to decline  in January 1990.  In the summer of 
1992,  the Nikkei  225  index fell  to around 15,000,  a loss  of more than 
60 percent from its peak at the end of  1989.  Although it had recovered 
to 20,000  by the end of 1992, monthly averages of the Nikkei 225 have 
since remained below 22,000,  again dipping to 15,000  during the sum- 
mer of 1995. In 1996, stock prices are at roughly their level of ten years 
ago.  Land prices peaked around the end of  1990,  one year after stock 
prices,  and then started on a decline  that, although not as steep as that 
of  stock prices,  was more sustained.  As of  1996,  land prices are also 
at roughly their level  of ten years ago. 
It is now  agreed that most  of the increase  in stock  and land prices 
during the second half of the 1980s represented a speculative  bubble- 
price  increases  were  based  purely on the anticipation  of  future price 
increases.  Disagreement  remains as to how much of the price increase 
was  speculative.  One  of  the  most  telling  fundamentals  behind  asset 
prices  is  the  cash  flow  from  the  asset,  given  by  rents  for  land  and 
dividends  for stocks.  Kazuo Ueda notes that dividends did not increase 
when stock prices rose in the second half of the 1980s,  and so the price- 
to-dividend  ratio was higher in the 1980s than it had been in the 1960s 
and 1970s.  In regard to land prices,  Keiko  Nosse  Hirono and I use  a 
hedonic  regression  to calculate  rents and purchase prices  for a stand- 
ardized high-rise  condominium  in Tokyo.7  We  show  that during the 
period of the bubble, the already low rental yield declined to only about 
0.25  percent.  Real  estate  investment  made sense  only  with  low-cost 
financing  and expected  capital  gains.  There  were  such  capital  gains 
until the end of  the  1980s.8 However,  by the late  1980s,  the low  and 
declining  direct yield  should have been a warning. 
Why  the Bubble? 
Today,  it has become  popular to blame Japanese monetary policy  in 
the second half of the  1980s  for creating the bubble,  although,  during 
the bubble, it was difficult to see why the boom had to stop, considering 
7.  Ueda (1990); Ito and Hirono  (1993). 
8.  See Ito (1993) for a model of land supply  constraints  resulting  in ever-increasing 
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that general price inflation remained relatively  low.  Interest rates were 
lowered  from  1985  to  1987,  and then maintained  at a low  rate until 
1989.  A  relatively  small  movement  in the interest  rate can certainly 
cause a large movement  in an asset price. Advocates  of this view  argue 
that an asset price can be derived as a present value  of future earning 
stream. Assuming  a constant growth in earning and a constant discount 
factor, the asset price (P) is given by P,  =  D, I (r  -  g),  where D is the 
dividend  (or rent),  r is  the discount  rate (interest  rate),  and g  is  the 
growth rate of the dividend.  The price will  increase if the interest rate 
is lowered,  or if the expected value of g increases. If r changes from 6 
percent to 4 percent while g remains at 3 percent, the value of  1/(r -  g) 
will  triple.  Between  1985  and  1987 the official  discount  rate was,  in 
fact, lowered from 5.0 percent to 2.5 percent. The 2.5 percent discount 
rate,  which  was  a record  low  at the  time,  was  maintained  until  the 
spring  of  1989.  Even  taking  into  account  that inflation  was  lower  in 
1987 than in 1985,  there was a substantial decrease in the real interest 
rate. However,  an interest rate change should not be viewed  as a once- 
and-for-all event.  If the interest rate change is expected  to last only for 
the duration of a business cycle,  the asset price should be less affected.9 
Additional  insight into monetary policy  can be gained by examining 
the monetary aggregate  for the second  half of the  1980s.  Since  1978, 
the  Bank  of  Japan has  announced  quarterly  forecasts  of  monetary 
growth (M2 plus certificates of deposit). The forecast was quite accurate 
until  1987,  in that the ex post monetary growth rate fell  within  1 per- 
centage point of the forecast rate.'0 Between  1987 and 1990 there were 
several occasions  on which actual monetary growth exceeded  the fore- 
cast  growth  range,  implying,  in  a stable  relation,  that there was  an 
unexpected  demand shock  and an accommodation  by the central bank 
during this period.  However,  during this period deposit  interest rates 
were being deregulated,  making the relation less stable and the forecast 
less  certain. 
Finally,  the pattern of bank lending to the real estate sector also helps 
9.  Ito and Iwaisako  (1996) show that  even if a 2.5 percentage  point decrease  in the 
interest  rate was expected to last for ten years and subsequently  return  to its original 
level,  the corresponding  increase in the asset price would be limited to a modest 20 
percent,  rather  than  the 200 percent  increase  obtained  under  the assumption  of permanent 
change. 
10. See Ito (1992, ch. 5) for a more detailed  description  of these data. Takatoshi Ito  217 
to explain  the nature  of the boom. Tokuo  Iwaisako  and  I perform  regres- 
sions explaining  changes in land prices and find  that  growth  in loans to 
the real estate sector is a significant  predictor."I  Bank lending to real 
estate increased sharply in the second half of the 1980s. When the 
bubble burst, many firms had to absorb financial losses and banks 
accumulated  nonperforming  loans. 
These are the main indicators  cited, after the fact, as evidence that 
lax monetary policy contributed  to the boom and bust. Against this 
criticism, it can be argued  that the general inflation  level was low, and 
so monetary  policy was on course. The CPI showed no sign of inflation 
until 1989, and, as measured by the wholesale price index (WPI), 
inflation was actually negative from 1986 to 1988. In addition, pre- 
venting the appreciation  of the yen was another  motive behind  the easy 
monetary  policy. After the yen appreciated  sharply  from around  260 in 
February  1985 to 150 in August 1986 (expressed as yen per dollar), 
monetary  policy was directed  toward  preventing  any further  apprecia- 
tion.  1'2 
In 1989-90 concern  about  excessive land prices, mainly in response 
to protests from prospective first-time homebuyers, brought about a 
turn  in monetary  policy. The interest  rate  was raised  five times between 
May 1989 and August 30,  1990. A ceiling on bank lending to the real 
estate sector was introduced  as an administrative  guidance in March 
1990. A special national  tax on large landholdings  was introduced,  and 
the assessment  of the real  estate  tax (a local tax) was revised, effectively 
raising it. These measures finally stopped the increase in asset prices 
and, in so doing, triggered  the bursting  of the bubble. 
Consequences  of the Bubble 
Once the tide had turned,  the asset deflation  was as swift as the asset 
inflation  had been. By 1992, the Japanese  economy was in a recession. 
Signs of trouble  first  appeared  in the real estate sector and then quickly 
spread  to financial  institutions. Many real estate companies and other 
companies that speculated with excess  funds in the stock and land 
markets  found  themselves in serious financial  difficulties. Construction 
1  1.  Ito and lwaisako  (1996,  p.  185). 
12.  See Ito (1992,  ch.  1 1) for some  evidence  that a soft  "target  zone"  was imple- 
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and  real estate companies, large and  small, started  to default  on interest 
payments  to banks. As a result of the burst  bubble, therefore,  Japanese 
banks were saddled with a large number of nonperforming  loans.'3 
These problems led to reforms in an overall bank policy in 1995, in- 
cluding the introduction  of a deposit insurance  system and procedures 
for warning  and for liquidating  weak and insolvent banks. 
From 1992 to 1995, the economy's growth rate remained  below 1 
percent. Hints of recovery were seen in 1993, but hopes were quickly 
dashed  by the yen appreciation  in that year. It is now the conventional 
wisdom about the period 1993-95 that output  and investment  in plant 
and  equipment  remained  weak as a result  of the appreciation  of the yen, 
and that consumption  and investment  were constrained  by the negative 
wealth  effect resulting  from  the burst  bubble. Although  the burst  bubble 
is not the sole reason for such a slow recovery, it is a major  problem. 
Could the Bubble Have Been Prevented? 
One lesson for Japan,  and also for other  economies, from the period 
of the bubble  is that  when financial  innovation  is taking  place, a differ- 
ent kind of monetary  policy is called for. Several observations  arise 
from recent experiences. Affordable  housing cannot  be an objective of 
monetary policy. The housing problem that finally turned monetary 
policy around  in 1989 should have been dealt with by more structural 
policy. In order  to control risk to the banking  system, it is desirable  to 
diversify bank portfolios. If particular  sectors of the economy are re- 
ceiving an increasing share of bank loans, the monetary authorities 
should  be concerned.  Therefore,  in the context of the bubble, an earlier 
tightening  could have been  justified  as prudent,  even if it was not needed 
to fight inflation. Admittedly, the timing was unfortunate,  because de- 
regulation and other changes in the financial system were evolving 
rapidly.  The old regulatory  environment,  based  on interest  controls  and 
lending quantity  controls, was dismantled  before the new supervisory 
system, more appropriate  to the deregulated  environment, was fully 
13. The banks  have been writing  off nonperforming  loans and  passing  some of them 
on to the cooperative  credit purchasing  companies. For the fiscal year ending March 
1996, many  banks  have reported  net losses due to write-offs  to housing  loans companies 
(jusen).  The Japanese  Ministry  of Finance  reports  that at the end of March 1996, the 
banking  sector was holding 35 trillion yen of nonperforming  loans, which represents 
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implemented.  Establishing policy  on the close  monitoring of bank bal- 
ance sheets,  or making sure that banks have that capacity themselves, 
becomes  important in the deregulated environment.  Prudential policy 
would impose a general standard, such as the Basle Accord's risk-based 
capital standard, and reinforce the deposit insurance system. 
In the case of Japan, these efforts did not come in time. For example, 
the capital standard and the evaluation of potential risk from asset price 
movements  have  become  more important in the deregulated  environ- 
ment. And the supervision of banks is especially  important in an econ- 
omy where these institutions play a large role relative to direct financing 
through equities and bond markets. In this regard, the strength of banks 
and the long-term relationship between banks and corporations are often 
praised in the literature on the Japanese economy;  but the importance 
of bank supervision  is rarely mentioned. 
The Challenge for  the 1990s 
In the four years from 1992 to 1995,  Japan's growth rate was below 
1 percent, the lowest rate among the GI 0 countries. Although the trough 
of  the recession  is officially  identified  as October  1993,  the recovery 
has been  extremely  weak.  The unemployment  rate has risen above  3 
percent  and continues  to rise  after two  and half  years of  recovery." 
Three issues,  in particular, are interesting at this juncture for the Jap- 
anese  economy.  First,  why  is the recession  so  prolonged  and the re- 
covery  so  weak?  Second,  does  the economy  need  structural change, 
and are features of the Japanese system  that were once  considered  its 
strengths now preventing needed change? Third, what are the changes 
that would restore growth to the economy? 
The  nonperforming  loans  that weakened  bank balance  sheets  after 
the bubble burst may have contributed to the weak expansion by limiting 
the ability and willingness  of banks to make new loans.  But that effect 
is hard to document.'5 The role of the exchange  rate is more evident. 
The yen appreciated by about 15 percent in the first half of  1993 and 
by  another  15 percent  in the  first half  of  1995  (although  the  second 
14. Although  the unemployment  rate is a lagged indicator  of the business cycle, it 
is unusual  that it should be rising so long after a trough. In the previous recession, 
1985-86, the unemployment  rate  rose for six months  after  the trough  in November  1986 
and  then started  to decline. 
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episode  was  followed  by  an offsetting  depreciation  in the  following 
months).  The economic  recovery  underway at the beginning  of  1993 
was  negatively  affected  by  that year's  appreciation,  which  helps  to 
explain  the  slow  growth  in  1993  and  1994.  Likewise,  the  dramatic 
swing  in the yen  during 1995,  when it appreciated from about 100 in 
January to 80 in April and fell back to 100 by September, dashed hopes 
for a strong recovery  in that year. 
Although  at around 110,  as of the summer of  1996,  the yen is con- 
sidered  to  favor Japanese exports,  many manufacturing firms are in- 
vesting  abroad in countries  where goods  can be produced even  more 
economically.  The Asian and North American subsidiaries  of the Jap- 
anese firms, especially  in the autombile and electronics  industries, have 
been expanding  rapidly in terms of both employment  and sales.  From 
1990 to  1994,  the number of employees  in the Asian  subsidiaries  in- 
creased from about 500,000  to 1 million;  while  in the North American 
subsidiaries,  the number increased from 370,000  to 523,000  during the 
same period.  The sales  of these  subsidiaries  have not changed  in yen 
denomination  over the period,  which implies  that sales have expanded 
by 20  to  30  percent in the currencies  of  their host countries.  As  key 
manufacturing  firms expand  their overseas  operations,  they  cut back 
production  in  Japan.  Japanese  manufacturing  employment  fell  from 
15.7 million  employees  in 1992 to  14.6 million  in 1995. 
The next section examines the conventional  wisdom on the Japanese 
system  in  light  of  new,  revisionist  views,  and the following  section 
discusses  the final quesion raised above,  of how to restore growth. 
The Japanese System 
As shown above,  Japan's record of growth, especially  from 1950 to 
1990,  was  certainly  respectable  for  an  economy  without  major  re- 
sources.  This  section  examines  several  features of the Japanese econ- 
omy  that are frequently  cited  as contributory  factors  to this  rapid 
growth. At first glance,  many of the institutional features-in  both the 
private  sector  and the  public  sector-seem  barely  to  resemble  their 
counterparts in the United  States  and European countries.  However, 
close  examination  reveals  that similar economic  incentives  have been 
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Positive  Views 
Although opinions differ on whether such unique features are essen- 
tial or superficial to economic  growth, the current majority view on key 
aspects  of  the  Japanese  system  (at  least  in  the  1950s  and  1960s)  is 
described  here.'6 
LIFETIME  EMPLOYMENT.  The  conventional  wisdom  highlights  the 
long-term  relationship between  Japanese firms and their workers: reg- 
ular workers are guaranteed a job for life,  and the firm does not lay off 
workers.  As a result,  involuntary job  changes  are rare and the unem- 
ployment rate is low. 17 Such an arrangement could be seen as evidence 
of labor market rigidity that invites  inefficiency.  However,  it is argued 
that life-time  employment  is only  one element  of Japanese labor rela- 
tions and that, considered as a whole,  the system promotes efficiency.  18 
Although  continued  employment  is to some degree guaranteed, job 
assignment,  working hours,  and rates of pay are quite flexible.  Given 
that workers are unlikely to quit, a firm can afford to spend the resources 
needed  to select  new  recruits carefully  and then provide  often  costly 
on-the-job  training. Rotation through different job skills  is common in 
both white-collar  and blue-collar  employment,  especially  at the begin- 
ning of an employee's  career. Rotation makes workers versatile at their 
present level  and prepares them for higher positions  in the same orga- 
nization.  This  investment  in firm-specific  human capital  helps  to  in- 
crease worker productivity  in the long run. 
It  is  often  said  that productivity  increases  were  mainly  due  to  a 
combination  of  innovations  in the  manufacturing  process  and better 
communication between all levels  in the firm, from planning and design 
to production to marketing. This was made possible  by a team of ver- 
16.  See Ito (1992) for greater  detail. 
17. It is striking  that Japan  has maintained  a low unemployment  rate for the past 
thirty-five  years. It was between 1 and 2 percent  in the 1950s and 1960s and has been 
between  2 and 3 percent  since the mid-1970s. 
18. In fact, only "core workers" receive an implicit assurance  of lifetime employ- 
ment;  that is, until age fifty-five  (or closer to sixty, lately). Traditionally,  women, part- 
timers, and seasonal laborers  have not been covered under  this arrangement,  and their 
employment  has introduced  a certain amount  of flexibility into the system. Lifetime 
employment  and a steep age-earning  profile started  in the late 1920s and 1930s, when 
some booming industries  found that frequent  job changes by their employees were 
detrimental  to factory  operations.  It did not spread  to the majority  of industries  until the 
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satile  workers  who  went  through on-the-job  training together  in  the 
same firm. In addition,  competition  in the domestic  labor market and 
deferred payment (a steep age-earning profile and substantial severance 
pay that is dependent on the length of service and the most recent salary 
of  the employee)  deters workers from shirking on the job  or quitting 
altogether.  Thus life-time  employment  is supported by an equilibrium 
of  implicit  contracts,  rather than an exogenous  constraint.  Moreover, 
it  is  self-sustaining:  life-time  employment  contributes  to  the  higher 
growth of a firm, and higher growth makes it possible  to maintain life- 
time employment. 
In short, life-time  employment does not guarantee a job specification 
for life.  A Japanese worker may be asked to take up a different job or 
to transfer to a subsidiary or a related company,  according to the needs 
of  production.  Such  high  mobility  within  the  company  (or group of 
companies)  has  in part been  made possible  by  the presence  of  labor 
unions  that encompass  different job  skills  within the company. '9 This 
system  works  especially  well  in an expansionary  environment,  since 
the relatively  large pool of  "underpaid"  younger workers makes pos- 
sible  more  "deferred"  payments  to retiring workers.  When the orga- 
nizational  hierarchy of  a corporation grows,  more management posi- 
tions are created,  and therefore deferred payments increase.  Although 
life-time  employment  is an integral part of Japanese labor relations that 
makes it possible  for firms to enhance their human capital through on- 
the-job training, it can also be seen as a type of pay-as-you-go  company 
pension  system. 
THE  MAIN  BANK  SYSTEM.  Strong, long-term relationships between 
banks  and firms are aften  cited  as  another source  of  strength  in  the 
Japanese economy.  In the 1950s and 1960s,  Japanese financial markets 
were dominated by banks. The stock and corporate bond markets were 
severely  restrained  by  laws  and regulations.20  Banks  intermediated 
19. The economic power of labor  unions in Japan  has never  been great  and, in fact, 
has been declining. Power resides at the local (company)  level, as in the United States. 
While in some European  countries  the central  bargaining  process  determines  wages and 
work rules not only for the unions that are involved in the negotiations  but also for 
workers in other firms and sectors, this is not the case in either Japan  or the United 
States. The rigidity represented  by such union strength  is often blamed for the high 
unemployment  rates in Europe, since firms are unwilling to expand their work forces 
for fear of being saddled  with too many workers  later. 
20.  For restrictions  on corporate  bond issues in the past, see Horiuchi  (1996). Takatoshi  Ito  223 
household  saving  and provided long-term as well  as short-term funds. 
Deposit  interest rates were regulated until the late  1980s,  and lending 
rates were implicitly kept low.  The Bank of Japan also restrained credit 
expansion  by reviewing  the projected  lending  increases  of  the major 
banks each quarter. During the economic  boom of the 1950s and 1960s, 
credit rationing was common.  In the traditional macroeconomic  view, 
financial  markets that are repressed  in this  way  may not allocate  re- 
sources correctly. 
However,  the Japanese banks have played a much broader role than 
that of lenders with monopoly  power.  In many cases,  a bank not only 
provides  loans  to  a firm,  but also  holds  its  stock.  Typically,  a firm 
develops  a relationship  with a particular bank and relies  on its steady 
support in funding over the long term. In return, the firm uses the bank 
for major transactions from which  the bank earns fees  and profits.  A 
bank that has this type of primary relationship  with a firm is called  a 
main bank.21  The conventional  view  (as of the end of the 1980s) is that 
the  main  bank  system  has  contributed  to  the  efficiency  of  Japanese 
financial  markets by  solving  the problem  of  asymmetric  information 
that is inherent in the separation of ownership and management. 
The main bank acts as an agent for investors and lenders to the firm, 
examining  the viability  of investment projects and monitoring the per- 
formance of management.  Individual stockholders do not monitor man- 
agement efforts,  and in Japan institutional investors have not exercised 
the kind of  monitoring  power,  such as pressing  for higher dividends, 
that they have in the United States.  Monitoring by a bank may, in fact, 
be more effective  at overcoming  the short-term perspective  of market 
discipline,  as exercised through stock prices, threats of hostile takeover, 
and pressures from institutional investors.  Because the main banks take 
a long-term view,  they will allow management to embark on long-term 
investment projects with fund commitment.  Since the main bank holds 
both equities  and debt,  it can act without conflict  of interests through 
both loans (secured)  and equities  (unsecured).  Moreover,  because  the 
bank is involved  in the business,  for example  by being represented on 
the board of directors, it can distinguish a temporary cash-flow problem 
from more serious situations involving  fundamental business  misjudg- 
21.  See Aoki and Patrick  (1994) for a comprehensive  discussion of the main bank 
system. The system has its origins in the wartime  regulation  that a firm  must designate 
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ment or insolvency.  The main bank will  be extremely  cautious  about 
closing  down  a failing  business  by calling  in loans; often,  it will  first 
send in an extra management team,  even  including  a replacement  for 
the president of the firm, if necessary. 
KEIRETSU.  In addition to the strong relationship between  banks and 
firms, the Japanese economy is characterized by long-term relationships 
between businesses  in the form of keiretsu, or enterprise groups. There 
are two  kinds  of  keiretsu: horizontal  (across  different  industries)  and 
vertical  (between  a manufacturer and its  suppliers,  or  its  wholesale 
distributors,  dealers,  and retailers). 
The most prominent horizontal keiretsu are the "big  six":  Mitsubi- 
shi,  Mitsui,  Sumitomo,  Ikkan (Dai-ichi-Kangyo),  Fuyo,  and Sanwa. 
(Some  enterprise groups,  most notably Mitsubishi,  Mitsui,  and Sumi- 
tomo,  originate from prewar, family-owned  conglomerates-zaibatsu. 
When the zaibatsu holding companies were dissolved  and monopolistic 
companies  were divided  by the Allied  force  at the end of World War 
II, the firms in each group remained loosely  connected around the main 
bank.)  Each  group  is  composed  of  between  twenty  and forty  large 
companies  in different industries, from manufacturing to finance.22 The 
objective  is to extend and diversify  a group's sectoral span. Each group 
has a strong bank, which acts also as a main bank to group firms. Group 
firms can hold a limited percentage of stock in each other. Horizontal 
keiretsu rarely act in an oligopolistic  manner: the firms compete  with 
others in the group. 
Conventional  wisdom  on the significance  of the keiretsu to the Jap- 
anese  economy  is similar to that on the main banks; they monitor the 
performance of management.  Since group firms hold each other's equi- 
ties,  they are effectively  safe from hostile  takeovers.  Management can 
therefore  concentrate  on  long-term  investment  projects,  rather than 
dressing up quarterly earnings reports. On the other hand, if group firms 
collectively  decide  that the management in a company has failed,  they 
can  replace  it  quite  easily.  By  encompassing  different  industries,  a 
22.  The Mitsubishi  group  is a case in point. The group's  core is most often defined 
by membership  in the Mitsubishi "president's club"; by this definition, there were 
twenty-nine  firms  as of October  1993. The group  includes  financial  institutions  (Mitsu- 
bishi Bank, Mitsubishi  Trust, Meiji Life, Tokio Marine  and Fire), trading  companies 
(Mitsubishi  Corporation),  shipbuilding  and  other  heavy manufacturing  companies  (Mit- 
subishi Heavy Industries),  and automobile  manufacturers  (Mitsubishi  Motors), among 
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horizontal keiretsu aims to maximize economies  of scale,  or the synergy 
of the group. 
Typically,  a vertical keiretsu includes a manufacturer and its various 
suppliers or the distributors of its products.  The beneficial  features of 
vertical keiretsu in the economy  have been explained as follows.  Trust, 
reputation for  quality,  and long-term  commitment  are all  significant 
elements  of  the repeated transactions between  a manufacturer and its 
suppliers  and distributors.  It is  very  difficult  to check  the quality  of 
each individual part and product when it is delivered or sold. Moreover, 
since  "lean  production"-just-in-time  delivery  and cutting  back  on 
inventory-has  become  a hallmark of  Japanese  manufacturing,  it  is 
crucial that suppliers make every effort to fill a manufacturer's orders 
on time.  The manufacturer evaluates  its suppliers'  records of on-time 
delivery  and rewards them  with  an implicit  guarantee of  continuing 
orders. The same principles of quality control, reliability,  and commit- 
ment are apparent in keiretsu comprising a manufacturer and a network 
of dedicated distributors. 
During the trade conflict between the United States and Japan in the 
second half of the 1980s,  some alleged  that keiretsu promote anticom- 
petitive,  protectionist behavior.23 The sins and virtues of keiretsu have 
been debated in the literature.24 A vertical keiretsu is more likely  than 
a horizontal keiretsu to exhibit anticompetitive behavior among it firms. 
Although  the vertical keiretsu is a source of efficiency  in production, 
in  some  cases,  a  large  manufacturer,  seeking  to  "maintain"  retail 
prices,  has refused to deal with deep discount stores. 
INDUSTRIAL  POLICY.  During  the  1950s  and  1960s,  the  government 
targeted certain industries  as  sunrise industries,  providing  them with 
various  subsidies  and protections  against  imports and domestic  com- 
petition  to  stimulate  their  expansion  and  success.  They  were  given 
policy  loans  (low-interest  loans  through government  financial institu- 
tions,  such as the Japan Development  Bank and the Japan Export and 
Import Bank) and foreign  exchange  allocations.  The government  also 
restricted entry to markets that were considered important and crowded. 
Likewise,  some markets were segmented  to limit competition. 
One influential,  although controversial,  interpretation of the indus- 
23.  The keiretsu  were a topic of discussion at the Structural  Impediments  Initiative 
negotiations  held between  the two countries  from September  1989 to June 1990. 
24.  See Lawrence  (1993) and Saxonhouse  (1993) for surveys  of the debate. 226  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
trial policy  of  this  period  goes  as follows.25  When  a chosen  sunrise 
industry  was  in  its  infancy,  the  government  protected  the  domestic 
market through quotas and high tariffs,  but allowed  domestic  firms to 
compete  in the captured market. Japanese firms either licensed  a tech- 
nology  or reverse engineered  foreign products and technology  to catch 
up in technology.  As the economy  grew and firms accumulated expe- 
rience in production,  the successful  ones were able to expand. Increas- 
ing  returns to  scale  brought down  production  costs.  And  increasing 
returns to scale were further enhanced when these Japanese firms started 
to export  and became  more competitive  in the world  market. At this 
stage,  restrictions on imports were liberalized.  This strategy of import 
substitution followed  by export promotion was most visible  in the steel 
and shipbuilding  industries. 
In fact,  this kind of  targeting was  almost  inevitable  in the  1950s, 
because the yen was overvalued and import restrictions (including quo- 
tas,  tariffs,  and foreign  currency allocations)  were necessary  to main- 
tain the fixed exchange  rate system  set by the Bretton-Woods  regime. 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Min- 
istry of Finance promoted particular industries simply by allowing them 
to use foreign currency allocations  to buy raw materials. 
Opponents of this view point to failures in the government's  attempt 
to identify  prospective  sunrise industries: coal,  petrochemicals,  oil re- 
fining,  and aluminum are examples.  In fact,  if productivity  increases 
are regressed  on  loans  from  the  Japanese  Development  Bank  at the 
industry  level,  the  relationship  is  negative.26 Consumer  electronics, 
probably one  of  the most  successful  export  industries,  never was  on 
MITI's  list  of  sunrise  industries.  The  automobile  industry is  another 
interesting case.  In the early  1960s,  MITI attempted to merge several 
automobile  manufacturers into two groups of firms, arguing that there 
were too  many automobile  manufacturers in Japan. The firms fought 
back  and maintained  their  independence.  If  MITI had  succeeded  in 
reducing  their number, domestic  competition  would have been  stifled 
and Japanese automobiles  might not have dominated the world market 
in the 1980s. 
25.  See Itoh and others (1988) and Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura  (1984). 
26.  See Beason and Weinstein  (1996). Takatoshi  Ito  227 
A broader consensus  has been achieved  on the beneficial  effects  of 
the government's  commitment to export promotion in general.27 Export 
promotion was certainly an important aspect of industrial policy  in the 
1950s  and  1960s,  but it too  was  largely  a necessary  response  to  the 
overvalued  currency. Unlike an import substitution policy,  export pro- 
motion  is  subject to the test  of  world  markets.  Success  is judged  by 
foreign  customers,  rather than captive domestic  customers. 
The composition  of Japanese exports has changed quite rapidly dur- 
ing  the postwar  period,  shifting  from textiles  and toys  to other light 
manufactured goods  in the  1950s; to consumer electronics,  steel,  and 
ships  in the  1960s  and 1970s;  to sophisticated  optical  products in the 
1970s; and to automobiles  and semiconductors  in the 1980s.  The struc- 
tural transformation of industry was one source of Japan's continuous 
success  at achieving  trade surpluses and rapid economic  growth. 
SAVING  AND  INVESTMENT.  The  Japanese  household  saving  rate has 
long been the highest among the major OECD countries.  As measured 
in the household  survey,  it rose from about 15 percent in the mid-1950s 
to above 20 percent at the beginning of the 1970s,  after which it started 
to decline;  it is now again at 15 percent.28 The high saving rate makes 
it possible  to realize  a high  investment  rate without  borrowing  from 
abroad. 
Japan's high saving rate has been the focus of much study.9  Opinions 
differ on whether the saving rate can be understood purely in terms of 
the life-cycle  hypothesis,  in which  people  save  for retirement during 
their productive  years.  One of  the consequences  of  the hypothesis  is 
that the saving rate rises with the growth rates of population and income. 
In other words, cross-country differences  in demographic structures and 
income growth rates will predict differences  in aggregate saving rates, 
even if households  are identical  across countries and periods. 
Although  the  qualitative  prediction  of  the  theory  seems  to  fit the 
Japanese experience,  the magnitude is questionable.  In particular, some 
economists  have suggested  that, in Japan, household  saving decisions 
are dominated by  the bequest  motive.  Some  surveys  do  suggest  that 
27.  See, for example, World  Bank (1993). 
28.  See Ito (1992, pp. 280-82) on the various  data  sources for the saving rate. 
29.  See Hayashi (1986), Horioka  (1990), and Ito and Kitamura  (1994), and their 
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Japanese households  save more than their U. S. counterparts in each age 
bracket.30 
EDUCATION.  Illiteracy  is  extremely  rare in Japan.  Elementary  and 
high school  education  emphasizes  basic skills  in language  and mathe- 
matics,  as well  as group activities.  Curriculums are nationally  stand- 
ardized,  and it is not possible  to skip a grade. University  admission  is 
by examination,  with  stiff  competition.  It is widely  accepted  that the 
Japanese  education  system  produces  highly  qualified  and effective 
workers. 
MACROECONOMIC AND  FINANCIAL POLICY. Despite the popular  image 
of  wide-ranging  industrial policy  and an interventionist  government, 
the national budget has historically been small relative to GDP in Japan. 
There  is  a separate public  investment  program,  known  as the Fiscal 
Investment  and Loans Program, that is funded from the postal  saving 
system,  but this money is generally used for government investment  in 
infrastructure.  Therefore,  at least  in  terms of  the  budget,  Japan has 
maintained a small government,  even  during its developmental  stage. 
Monetary policy has been successful  at accommodating financing needs 
with limited general inflation, except during 1973-74  and the period of 
the bubble. 
Government  revenues  and expenditures  were,  in  effect,  balanced 
until 1965. Government bonds for infrastructure (so-called  construction 
bonds) have been issued  since  1965,  and deficit financing bonds since 
the mid-1970s.  Government deficits grew rapidly in the second half of 
the 1970s,  but fiscal austerity had staunched the issuance of new deficit- 
financing bonds by  1990. 
In retrospect,  it can be seen that mistakes  in monetary policy  were 
committed at times of major regime changes.  Monetary policy  became 
too  lax  in  1972,  partly in response  to yen  appreciation  and partly at 
Prime Minister Tanaka's request, because of his "reconstruction  of the 
Japanese archipelago"  initiative.  This added to wild inflation of  1973 
that had been triggered by the first oil  crisis.  Monetary policy  is also 
blamed for fueling  speculative  activity at the height of financial dereg- 
ulation and innovation  in the late  1980s,  thereby contributing to asset 
price volatility.  Both of these episodes  were related to the determina- 
30.  On the dominance of the bequest motive, see Barthold and Ito (1992) and 
Hayashi, Ando, and Ferris (1988); and for survey data, see Takayama  and Kitamura 
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tion  of  the  business  community  and the  government  to  prevent  yen 
appreciation.31 
The expansion  of government deficits in the second half of the 1970s 
can be attributed to several  factors.  First, the government  might have 
mistaken the potential growth rate.32  As discussed  above,  trend growth 
rates declined  sharply in  1973-74,  but many economists  in the mid- 
1970s believed  that Japan would return to higher growth rates (of 8 to 
10 percent)  once  oil  prices  were  stabilized.  Accordingly,  the govern- 
ment overstimulated  the economy  with deficit  spending.  Second,  the 
social  security  reforms  of  1973  proved  more costly  than anticipated. 
Third,  it was  expected  that broad-based  indirect taxes  would  fill  the 
fiscal gap,  but the proposed legislation  never materialized.  Fourth, the 
Bonn Summit of  1978 demanded that Germany and Japan further stim- 
ulate their economies  in order to reduce their trade surpluses and pro- 
mote  growth  in  other  industrialized  countries,  notably,  the  United 
States.  Budget deficits reached 6.0  percent of GNP in 1979. 
As a result of a strong economy  and speculative  activities  that pro- 
duced unexpectedly  high tax revenues in the late 1980s,  no new deficit 
bonds  were  issued  in  1991  or  1992.  However,  budget  deficits  have 
grown since  1993,  as the government has attempted to lift the economy 
out of recession. 
Critical  Views 
The  features  that used  to  be  considered  strengths  of  the Japanese 
economy  are now  considered  by some  to be obstacles  to overcoming 
the difficulties of the 1990s.33 
LIFETIME  EMPLOYMENT.  Conventionally  regarded as an effective  way 
of accumulating  firm-specific  human capital,  the guarantee of lifetime 
employment  might  be  detrimental  to  the  firm in  the  1990s  for  two 
reasons.  First,  in the current climate  of  slow  growth in domestic  cor- 
porate investment,  the promise  of lifetime  employment  cannot be up- 
held.  Second,  the  type  of  innovation  that would  increase  growth  in 
31.  Ueda  (1993) also considers  these  two episodes  to have  been mistakes  of monetary 
policy. 
32.  See Asako, Ito, and Sakamoto  (1991). 
33.  Some of the following arguments  can be found in Japan, Economic Planning 
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Japan in the  1990s  cannot take place  in the context  of labor relations 
that hinge on lifetime  employment. 
The principle of using deferred payments to motivate workers is now 
in danger of self-destruction  for the same reasons that a pay-as-you-go 
pension system runs into difficulties  in an aging economy: arrangements 
that worked in a high-growth  environment  begin  to fail.  When future 
corporate growth estimates  are revised downward,  the forecasts  of the 
deferred payments  that will  ultimately  be paid to current workers fol- 
low.  If zero growth continues for about another decade,  it is quite likely 
that workers who  are now  in their forties  will  retire to find that their 
age-earning  profiles  have  not been  as  steep  as those  of  the previous 
generation-a  subtle  breach of  implied  contract.  The recent increase 
in the unemployment  rate foretells  the prospect,  although firms, con- 
cerned to maintain their reputations in the eyes  of prospective  recruits, 
have so far honored their implicit  contractual obligation  not to lay off 
workers. 
In addition,  the type of innovation  sought in the  1990s  seems  to be 
difficult to generate with the Japanese system of labor relations.  On the 
frontier of  development  are high-technology,  service-oriented  indus- 
tries,  such as computer software,  communications,  and financial prod- 
ucts.  These  industries are typically  supported by venture capital busi- 
nesses,  and they employ  workers with highly  specialized  skills.  In this 
context,  the  Japanese  way  of  educating  and training  workers  to  be 
versatile  is counterproductive.  The limitations  of job rotation and em- 
ployment  security have become  obvious. 
THE  MAIN  BANK  SYSTEM.  The  role  of  the  main bank system  in the 
1990s  is  also  open  to question.  In this case,  there are two  strands of 
argument.  First,  banks generally  play a diminishing  role as industrial 
economies  mature. Second,  the behavior and performance of Japanese 
banks during the bubble  and its collapse  have  cast doubt on the con- 
ventional  view. 
During the period of the bubble (1985-90),  firms were able to issue 
new  equities  because  stock  prices  were  expected  to  rise.  Domestic 
corporate  bond  markets were  still  regulated,  both  through restricted 
access and through underwriting fees,  but firms were able to issue Euro- 
convertible bonds and warrants on favorable terms.34  Some firms repaid 
34.  In fact, these bonds  were also purchased  by Japanese  institutional  investors;  they Takatoshi  Ito  231 
all their bank loans  and freed themselves  from the main banks.  Since 
Japanese financial  markets have been  deregulated,  the need for main 
banks,  and banks in general,  has clearly declined. 
Throughout the 1980s, the industrial countries, including Japan, rap- 
idly  liberalized  their financial  markets.  Regulations  on  interest rates 
were abolished; entry into new services  and geographical  regions  (do- 
mestic and international) was increasingly liberalized; and new products 
and markets, most notably derivatives,  were developed.  In Japan, most 
controls  on capital inflows  and outflows  were lifted  in the first half of 
the  1980s.  On the domestic  front,  all interest rate regulations  had ef- 
fectively  been lifted by the beginning of the 1990s. The Bank of Japan's 
restrictions on lending  increases by the major banks were abolished  in 
1994.  As  regulations  on capital  controls,  corporate bond issues,  and 
new  stock  offerings  were dismantled,  corporations were able to raise 
funds directly  in domestic  and international capital markets instead of 
borrowing from banks. Borrowing costs started to reflect the credit risk 
of corporations,  and corporate information was made open to the mar- 
ket,  rather than being  hidden  in earnings  reports that could  only  be 
deciphered by the main banks. 
However,  the most damaging evidence  on the role of the main bank 
system  is  that when  the bubble  burst,  the  number of  nonperforming 
loans soared and bank balance sheets became fragile.  The burst bubble 
affected  Japanese banks in two ways,  one familiar and the other quite 
Japanese.  First,  the sharp decline  in land prices hurt both speculators 
and developers-both  those  who  held land merely on the prospect of 
rising prices and those who held land with the intention of developing 
it. As speculators and developers  went bankrupt, banks were left with 
nonperforming loans or repossessed  collateral with inflated book value. 
In many instances,  a bank extended loans to real estate-related  projects 
in amounts close  to market value,  so that when land prices  declined, 
collateral  did  not  cover  the  outstanding  loans.  Banks  have  got  into 
trouble in this way in many countries.  For example,  similar problems 
occurred in the 1980s in the United States,  with the savings  and loans 
crisis,  and in the Scandinavian countries. 
Second,  the decline in stock prices also hit the banks' balance sheets. 
had  to go to the European  market  both to issue and to purchase  their  corporate  bonds in 
order to avoid the regulations, steep fees,  and commissions in Japan. All eligibility 
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As  noted  above,  many  Japanese  banks  have  substantial  holdings  of 
stock in the firms and groups of firms with which they have long-term 
relationships.  On the balance sheet, these long-term holdings are valued 
at the original  purchase price,  which  is far below  market value.  This 
kind of unrealized capital gain (fukumi) serves as a financial buffer for 
banks faced with unexpected  losses  (for example,  when a loss-making 
subsidiary is liquidated,  or a rogue trader causes huge trading losses). 
The banks could easily  have dealt with the nonperforming loans due to 
the decline  in land prices  if stock prices had not declined  at the same 
time.  Moreover,  some  of the unrealized capital gains  were eligible  to 
be  counted  as tier 2  capital  in the Basle  Accord's  risk-based  capital 
standard, which was scheduled for implementation by the end of March 
1993. The fall in stock prices in 1990 and 1991 brought the capital ratio 
of Japanese banks close  to the 8 percent minimum.  The decline  in the 
value of these unrealized capital gains and its implication for the capital 
standard was partially alleviated by a new administrative guidance that 
allowed  banks to issue  subordinated debt (which is also counted as tier 
2  capital)  to  be  purchased  by  institutional  investors.  However,  this 
subordinated debt reportedly carries high interest rates.35 
In the mid-1990s,  it has become  clear  that healthy  manufacturing 
firms can raise funds from capital markets on more favorable terms than 
banks are willing  to offer.  On the other hand, the decision  of banks to 
extend  such large amounts of debt to the real estate sector shows  that 
they are no more prudent than other corporations in a deregulated world. 
If  the  banks  are so  smart at monitoring  the  investment  projects  and 
management performance of the firms to which they lend,  surely they 
could have monitored themselves  to avoid the nonperforming loans. 
The nonperforming loans of housing loan companies (jusen) became 
the focus  of  attempts to tackle the general problem of  nonperforming 
loans  in  1995.  The jusen  had borrowed  from banks and agricultural 
cooperatives  and lent  to  the  real  estate  sector.  Most  of  these  loans 
became nonperforming when the bubble burst. When the situation was 
finally resolved,  in December  1995,  the expected  net losses  (nonper- 
forming loans less expected  recovery values)  due to the defaults of the 
35.  Precise information  on the interest rate is not available because there is no 
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jusen  were  estimated  at one-third  of  the total expected  losses  of  the 
banking sector.36 
One characteristic of the main bank system is that banks other than 
the main bank also lend to the firm, relying  on the monitoring  ability 
of the main bank. Banks collectively  share the task of monitoring firms, 
while  diversifying  their risks.  Bank lending  to jusen  in the late  1980s 
was conducted  in a similar manner. Although  an individual jusen  is a 
subsidiary of a group of banks, it receives  loans not only from its parent 
banks but also from other banks,  as well  as from credit cooperatives. 
The fact that banks were in overall charge of lending and of monitoring 
management  teams  composed  of  former bank employees  and former 
officials of the Ministry of Finance probably encouraged the agricultural 
cooperatives  to rely on their parent banks'  assessments  of  the credit- 
worthiness  of jusen  business. 
In resolving  the jusen  losses,  the greatest  burden was  laid  on  the 
banks that had originally  founded the jusen.  This might be consistent 
with the conventional  view  of the main bank system,  in that the main 
bank is  implicitly  responsible  for  the  financial  troubles  of  the  firm. 
However,  it also  indicates  (possibly  terminal) difficulties  in the rela- 
tionship.  Many banks,  especially  the smaller ones,  have lost  so much 
of  the cushioning  around their core financial soundness  as a result of 
nonperforming  loans  that further problems  would  threaten their sur- 
vival.  Moreover, faced with increasing competitive pressure as financial 
markets become  integrated,  banks  will  no  longer  be  able  to  absorb 
losses  that are not already disclosed  on their balance sheets. 
KEIRETSU.  The strengths of the keiretsu do not seem to be effective 
for Japanese growth in the 1990s.  The current frontier of technological 
36.  The seven jusen borrowed  a total of about 13 trillion yen in 1995, of which 6 
trillion  yen was from banks  and 5.5 trillion  yen from agricultural  cooperatives  and their 
prefectural  federations  (ken shin ren), which collect and jointly manage funds from 
individual  cooperatives.  Of the 6.4 trillion  yen in immediate  losses, 5.2 trillion  yen was 
to be shouldered  by the banks, while the liability of the agricultural  cooperatives  was 
limited to 530 billion yen. The government  agreed to inject 680 billion yen from the 
budget  for fiscal year 1996 to fill the gap. However,  the government's  outlay  is expected 
to be recovered  by the long-term  profits  on a fund set up by the banks. This outcome  is 
widely regarded  as evidence of the political clout of the agricultural  cooperatives.  The 
delayed  resolution  of the situation  and  the relatively  large  burden  imposed  on the banks 
damaged  their  balance  sheets and may have diminished  their  financial  competitiveness. 
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innovation  is  in  industries  and  companies  that  are not  traditionally 
affiliated with keiretsu. The horizontal keiretsu are typically  composed 
of large companies  in finance and manufacturing. It is not these estab- 
lished  firms that are likely  to experience  the next wave  of expansion, 
but service sector industries, such as computer software, transportation, 
discount retailing,  and entertainment. 
For their part, the vertical  keiretsu  are not generally  suited  to the 
organizational needs of the service sector. In the manufacturing sector, 
further efficiency  will depend on the initiatives of large discount stores 
and other retailers  to  eliminate  intermediaries,  or at least  to  reduce 
transportation costs  and the profit margins of  wholesalers,  not on the 
keiretsu relationship.  Moreover,  the relationship between the manufac- 
turers and suppliers  is experiencing  a different  challenge.  Due  to the 
strong yen,  a growing  number of  manufacturers is  investing  abroad. 
Some  small  suppliers that have provided these firms with just-in-time 
deliveries  are finding it difficult to follow  them to assembly sites abroad. 
INDUSTRIAL  POLICY.  The role of traditional industrial policy  and ex- 
port promotion  is  unquestionably  minimal  in Japan in the  1990s,  as 
compared with the past.  It is not likely  that sustained high growth in 
the Japanese economy  in the future will come from increasing exports. 
As  a result of  trade conflicts  with the United  States  in the late  1980s 
and the early  1990s,  the promotion of imports has begun to be empha- 
sized at the expense of exports. MITI has established various initiatives, 
including  providing foreign  exporters with rent-free offices  in Tokyo. 
SAVING  AND  INVESTMENT.  Rapid demographic change is projected to 
give Japan one of the oldest populations in the world by 2025.  The ratio 
of productive persons (ages fifteen to sixty-four) to retired persons (ages 
sixty-five  and over)  is projected to decline  from 5.8  in  1990 to 2.3  in 
2025.37  Even this estimate may be too optimistic,  since in the past few 
years the birth rate has fallen below  that estimated in the 1992 projec- 
tions.  According  to the life-cycle  hypothesis,  the more retired persons 
there are, the lower the saving rate becomes.  A lower saving rate will 
reduce Japanese current account surpluses (by increasing domestic con- 
sumption  without  changing  investment),  reduce growth (by  lowering 
investment),  or both.  In any case,  demographic  change  over the next 
thirty years will  probably bring down the Japanese growth rate, unless 
37.  Japan,  Ministry  of Health  and Welfare, Institute  of Population  Studies (1992). Takatoshi  Ito  235 
productivity  increases  more  than offset  the  lower  investment  rate.38 
Even if the bequest  motive  pushed up the saving rate in the past,  it is 
not  certain  (or  even  likely)  that the  bequest  motive  remains  strong 
today,  since  the value  of household  stocks  (durables and financial as- 
sets)  is  now  so  much  greater.  It seems  inevitable  that the  Japanese 
saving  rate will  decline  in coming  years. 
Japanese  investment  is  decreasing  in the  1990s.  This  is  partly in 
reaction to the high levels  of investment during the period of the bubble, 
but it is  also  partly a result of  the fact  that manufacturing firms are 
investing  abroad. If investment  abroad is only  a temporary phenome- 
non, then investment  in manufacturing will recover soon.  However,  if 
the  real  exchange  rate  remains  high,  recovery  is  unlikely  to  be 
imminent. 
EDUCATION.  The  Japanese  education  system  has  successfully  pro- 
duced a homogeneous,  group-oriented labor force,  well versed in basic 
skills.  However,  many now argue that the current system does not foster 
the creativity  and specialized  skills  needed  to make breakthroughs in 
research.  In particular, it appears that students are not learning highly 
specialized  computer-oriented  skills. 
The  strong  pressure  to  pass  university  entrance  examinations  en- 
courages  high  school  students  to  study hard without  questioning  the 
material,  and trains them to memorize  facts rather than to think inde- 
pendently.  Moreover,  since students cannot enter university early (they 
cannot  skip  a grade,  nor is  there  any  equivalent  of  the  U.S.  gifted 
programs that go beyond  the curriculums necessary  to gain admission 
to university),  creative thinking and specialized  training typically  must 
wait until students are eighteen.  And some students are burned out by 
that time.  Finally,  the use  of  computers  is limited  in elementary  and 
high school  education.  The ratio of computers to students is typically 
lower  in Japan than in the United  States,  and it appears that Japanese 
curriculums lag behind those in the United States in terms of informa- 
tion technology. 
MACROECONOMIC  FUNDAMENTALS.  Government deficits  rose  sharply 
in  the  first half  of  the  1990s.  Once  again,  this  was  a response  to  a 
weaker than expected  economy.  At this point,  it is not certain that the 
38.  For a comparative  study of Japan  and the United States on issues related  to an 
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potential  growth  rate has  changed  markedly  in the  1990s.  If  it has, 
indeed,  slowed  down,  the deficit financing in the first half of the 1990s 
was a repeat of the mistakes of the second half of the 1970s.  However, 
reducing the deficit in the future will  be more difficult than was fiscal 
consolidation  in the  1980s.  The aging population is lowering  the ratio 
of productive to unproductive workers and laying the burden of deficit 
reduction on workers,  either by raising taxes  or by curtailing govern- 
ment services,  will  be a political  challenge. 
Toward Structural Reform 
As discussed  above,  the very features for which the Japanese econ- 
omy  has been  praised  in the past seem  now  to be  set  against  further 
growth.  Unless  there is some structural reform, new industries will not 
emerge  and the  slow  growth  will  continue.  The  appropriate kind  of 
reform and the new  leading  industries that might emerge  are debated 
intensively  in Japan. The differential growth rates of different sectors, 
which were touched on in regard to the Balassa-Samuelson  hypothesis, 
are suggestive  of  the problem.  Table  3 presents ten-year breakdowns 
of the data in table 2 to show how productivity growth rates have been 
slowing  down over the past three decades.  The effect  is seen across the 
board, but services,  construction,  and agriculture are at the bottom of 
the productivity  ranking.  Moreover,  construction  and services  regis- 
tered large price increases in the 1980s.  The agricultural sector had the 
fourth  highest  rate of  price  increase  in  the  1970s,  but  its  rate  was 
moderate in the  1980s. 
The apparent negative  correlation between  the productivity  growth 
and price increase is consistent  with theory. The less labor productivity 
increases,  the more labor costs  increase.  Slower  productivity  gains in 
certain sectors are typically  regarded in the literature as technologically 
given.  However,  it might  be that competition  in these  sectors  is  not 
intense enough to force management to pursue maximum efficiency  in 
production. This is especially  plausible in the Japanese context,  because 
the sectors  with slow  productivity  growth are nontradable sectors,  for 
which  competition  from abroad or by foreign  companies  in Japan has 
been minimal.  In addition,  it is possible  that legal barriers and regula- 
tions have constrained these industries more than others. This argument Takatoshi Ito  237 
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is supported by the observation  that the focus  of fair trade complaints 
against Japan by the United States has shifted from particular Japanese 
manufactured exports  to  access  for  U.S.  companies  to  nontradables 
markets in Japan. For example,  such complaints  have highlighted  the 
large-scale  retail store law,  in regard to distribution (for example,  the 
opening  of  Toys  'R'  Us  stores  in Japan); trust banks and investment 
advisory services  for pension fund management; and procurement con- 
tracts for the construction of the new Kansai airport. The export of U. S. 
rice and apples to Japan has also been hotly debated.  While  these  are 
tradable goods  by nature, Japan has restricted their import for political 
and other reasons. 
Further evidence  that  the  nontradable  sectors  are causing  higher 
prices  in Japan is  given  by  a direct price  comparison,  using  a fixed 
consumption  basket.  According  to  the  Japanese  Economic  Planning 
Agency,  in November  1994 the cost  of  living  in Tokyo  was  approxi- 
mately 50 percent higher than that in New York. Notably,  rents and the 
prices  of energy  and utilities  are about twice  as high in Tokyo,  while 
food  and clothing  prices are close  to 70 percent higher.39 
A welfare  implication  of  the Balassa-Samuelson  hypothesis  is that 
real exchange  rate appreciation is usually  a blessing,  because  it shows 
that a country's  productivity  growth in tradable sectors  is higher than 
that of its trading partner. The implicit  underlying  assumption here is 
that nontradable sectors  grow  at similar rates across countries.  How- 
ever, the Japanese experience  in the 1990s-real  currency appreciation 
with  only  average  productivity  growth in tradable sectors-indicates 
another interpretation of the Balassa-Samuelson  hypothesis  is possible: 
appreciation may be a sign of slow productivity growth in nontradable 
sectors,  which is hardly a blessing. 
Deregulation  and measures  to enhance  competition  in the  slow 
growth sectors will  be beneficial  from the point of view  of consumers 
and also for overall economic  efficiency.  Discussions  follow  of several 
sectors and industries that might benefit from structural reform. 
Airlines 
The experiences  of Japan's airlines illustrates that regulations  stifle 
an industry and that deregulation  substantially lowers the price of ser- 
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vices.40 Air routes and airfares in Japan were  heavily  regulated until 
1986.  New  entry  into  the  market was  prohibited  and  airfares  were 
proportional to the distance  of  the routes,  regardless  of  demand and 
supply. Under administrative guidance,  the three major airlines divided 
up the markets: Japan Air Lines took all major domestic  (trunk) lines, 
as well  as regular international service;  All  Nippon  Airways  took do- 
mestic lines and also short-range international charter services; and Toa 
Domestic  Airlines  (subsequently,  Japan Air System)  took short-range 
domestic  service.  Many domestic  routes were served by only one  air- 
line,  a few by all three. 
In 1986 the process  of reform was started by allowing  new entry to 
specific  routes.  For  example,  Japan Air  Lines  took  more  domestic 
routes and All Nippon Airways took a few regular international routes. 
However,  in general,  airfares were still tightly regulated; only the mul- 
tiple-coupon discount gave a fixed rate off the official fares. As a result, 
airfares for a given distance were much higher than in the United States. 
Hirotaka Yamauchi  and I compare domestic  airfares in Japan and the 
United States for the late 1980s and early  1990s and find that, in most 
cases,  the unit price (yen  per kilometer)  of  discounted  fares in Japan 
was  twice  (on  short routes)  or three times  (on  long  routes)  as  high 
as  in  the  United  States.4'  One  major problem  was  the  Ministry  of 
Transport's  restrictive  guidelines  on  setting  airfares and ceilings  on 
discounts. 
The regulation of airfares in Japan was substantially relaxed only in 
1996.  Although  regular fares are still based on distance,  airlines  now 
have  greater flexibility  in setting  these  fares,  and the ceiling  on dis- 
counts  has been raised to 50  percent of  the regular fare.  The airlines 
immediately  introduced various discount  fares,  based on season,  time 
of day,  advance purchase,  and restrictions on changes  and refunds: all 
features that appeared in the U.S.  market fifteen years ago, in the wake 
of airline deregulation.  However,  because air routes and the frequency 
of service  are still regulated,  it remains virtually impossible  to develop 
an innovative  route  system,  such  as  the  hub-and-spoke  system  pi- 
oneered in the deregulated U.S.  market of the mid-1980s. 
It is not clear that regulation has helped the Japanese airline industry. 
40.  For detailed  discussion, see Yamauchi  and Ito (1996). 
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Although the three carriers were highly profitable during the period of 
the bubble, both Japan Airlines and Japan Air System reported sustained 
losses  in the first half  of  the  1990s.  Moreover,  even  in international 
markets, such as between Japan and North America (including Hawaii), 
Japanese carriers are losing  ground to their foreign rivals.  The ratio of 
passengers on Japanese carriers to the total passengers  over the Pacific 
declined  from 40 percent in 1986 to 33 percent in 1994. 
These  competitive  losses  on  international routes  and the high  do- 
mestic prices (or lack of discounts)  show that regulations have prohib- 
ited  innovative  management  and  stifled  productivity  growth  in  the 
airline  industry.  During  the  bubble,  these  problems  were  hidden  by 
buoyant demand; when  the bubble burst,  it became  all too clear that 
change is long overdue.42 
Telecommunications  and Broadcasting 
Until  1985,  the provision of telephone  services  in Japan was divided 
into international and domestic markets, monopolized  by Kokusai Den- 
shin Denwa  (KDD)  and Nippon  Telephone  and Telegraph  (NTT),  re- 
spectively.  In that year,  deregulation  allowed  one  set of new entrants 
into the international market, and another into the domestic  long-dis- 
tance market. Local  service  remained a monopoly  of NTT.43 
International charges  have  declined  by  half  over  the past decade. 
Likewise,  NTT  halved  its  domestic  long-distance  telephone  charges 
(measured by the maximum distance) between  1985 and 1992,  mainly 
due to pressure from new entrants to the market. The details of access 
to local  markets (for example,  the degree of openness  and how to set 
access charges) have not yet been completely  resolved,  and NTT main- 
tains its advantageous  position  relative  to other long-distance  compa- 
nies.  These  data show that deregulation  and competition  are powerful 
forces  for lowering  the price of services. 
Several major problems remain, however.  First, domestic  long-dis- 
tance and international services  are still  separate,  so scale  economies 
cannot be fully  implemented.  Second,  debate continues  as to whether 
42.  After  the first  draft  of this paper  was written,  the Japanese  Ministry  of Transport 
announced  that it will allow new companies  to enter  the domestic  market.  Two compa- 
nies plan to enter  the Tokyo-Sapporo  route  over the next two years. 
43.  The extent of deregulation  and its effects on other industries  are discussed in 
detail by Okuno, Suzumura,  and Nanbu  (1993). Takatoshi  Ito  241 
NTT  should  be divided  regionally,  or a long-distance  division  of  the 
company should be separated from the local monopoly,  or there should 
be some  other arrangement that would combine  the two options. 
Third,  local  charges  in Japan are proportional to the length  of  the 
call (typically  10 yen for three minutes).  Although this system has not 
been  a problem  for regular voice  use,  it becomes  an issue  with  the 
widespread  use  of the internet and the worldwide  web.  In the United 
States,  arrangements for unlimited  local  calls  at a fixed  monthly  fee 
(typically,  around $25 a month) are prevalent. Despite recent initiatives 
allowing  unlimited  local  calls  late  at night,  the  situation  in Japan is 
much different.44 Some argue that proportional charges are responsible 
for the slow spead of telecommunications  in Japan. It is estimated that, 
as of January 1,  1994,  there were more than 10 million  internet users 
in the United States, while in Japan there were approximately 330,000, 
less  than half the number in Germany,  the United  Kingdom,  or Aus- 
tralia.45 Here is evidence  that high nontradables prices  are preventing 
the growth of the new information industries in Japan. 
Broadcasting is another service industry that provides a stark contrast 
between  Japan and the United  States.  In the United States,  cable tele- 
vision  systems  spread rapidly throughout the  1980s,  and by the early 
1990s,  many  urban households  had access  to  forty  to  fifty  channels 
through a community antenna television  (CATV, or "cable television") 
system.46 In Japan, few households  subscribe to CATV service.  Satel- 
lite television-direct  reception by individual households,  via a dish- 
is  popular: more than 6 million  households  subscribe  to the  satellite 
channels  of the public broadcasting corporation,  Nihon Hoso  Kyokai. 
But  only  four channels  are available  from broadcasting  satellites.  A 
greater number of  channels  are available  from communications  satel- 
44.  Since August 1995, NTT has offered customers unlimited calls to only two 
registered  local numbers  between 11 p.m. and  8 a.m., for the monthly  fee of 1,800 yen. 
Other  carriers  offer various  discounts  on monthly  fees, some without  restrictions  on the 
timing  of calls. Nevertheless,  the costs of using the internet  are extremely  high in Japan 
relative  to the United States. 
45.  Joho Tsushin  Sogo Kenkyujo  (1994). 
46.  In the United States, the incidence of cable access among households with 
televisions grew from less than  50 percent  in 1980 to close to 90 percent  in 1990, while 
in Japan  the incidence  was around  10  percent  in 1995. An estimated  3 million  households 
subscribe  to CATV service, out of a total of more  than  40 million households  in Japan. 
(U.S. numbers  are  from  Levy and  Setzer, 1991;  Japanese  numbers  are  from  the Japanese 
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lites,  although at a much higher cost.  In October 1996 digital broadcast 
satellite television  ("perfect  television")  service was initiated, provid- 
ing more than sixty channels; it remains to be seen how popular it will 
become. 
These new developments  in telephone and CATV are important. The 
services  provided by the telecommunications  and the broadcasting in- 
dustries will increasingly  overlap in coming years. It is technologically 
feasible  to carry local telephone  service over CATV systems,  and pro- 
vision is likely to be realized soon.  Teleconferencing  on the internet (in 
effect,  a  local  telephone  call  for  the  customer)  could  replace  long- 
distance  and international telephone  calls.  And banking and financial 
services  (settlements  as well  as transfers between  accounts) could also 
be offered through the internet. Given these imminent innovations,  the 
current state of telephone  service,  internet access,  CATV systems,  and 
other broadcasting services in Japan suggest that rapid and major change 
is needed to catch up with the United States. 
Financial  Services 
Hollowing  out, which occurs when domestic  firms move their oper- 
ations abroad and is a sign of loss of competitiveness,  is not limited to 
the manufacturing sector in Japan: some  analysts  claim  that it is  also 
evident  in the financial sector.  This argument is based on at least two 
sets of developments.  First, when the same or similar products can be 
issued or traded either in Japan or abroad, Japanese businesses  tend to 
go abroad, due to high domestic  fees on issuance and transactions. For 
example,  Nikkei  225  futures  are traded on the Osaka Securities  Ex- 
change  (OSE),  the  Singapore  International  Monetary  Exchange 
(SIMEX),  and  the  Chicago  Mercantile  Exchange  (CME);  Euro yen 
interest rate futures are traded on both the Tokyo International Financial 
Futures Exchange  (TIFFE) and SIMEX; corporate bonds are issued  in 
Japan and in the Euro market; and Japanese stocks  are traded both in 
Japan and on London's Stock Exchange Automated Quotations (SEAQ) 
international.47 Second,  the number of firms listed on the Tokyo  Stock 
47.  The most frequently  quoted  statistic  is that  SEAQ  transactions  have grown  to 30 
percent  of transactions  of the same stocks on the Tokyo Stock Exchange  (TSE). How- 
ever, this may be an exaggeration:  SEAQ transactions  will be double-counted  if SEAQ 
members trade stock among one another, and a transaction  by a SEAQ member is Takatoshi  Ito  243 
Exchange  (TSE)  has been declining  since  1991,  and firms expanding 
out of  emerging  markets in Asia  tend to choose  the New  York Stock 
Exchange  (NYSE),  rather than the TSE,  for their first listing  abroad.48 
I  elaborate  only  on  the  first issue  here,  focusing  on  competition 
between  the OSE and SIMEX.49 As  discussed  above,  Japanese stock 
prices  rose  sharply from  1985  to  1989  and then plummeted  between 
1990  and  1992.  Nikkei  225  futures  trading was  first introduced  on 
SIMEX  in  1986,  and then on  the OSE  in  1988,  and on the CME in 
1990.  Aided by the increasing stock prices and heavy domestic trading, 
the market share of the OSE in global Nikkei futures trading exceeded 
95 percent in  1991.  However,  from  1992 to  1994 the market share of 
SIMEX increased at the expense  of the OSE. The value of transactions 
on SIMEX had grown to about half of the value of transactions on the 
OSE by  the end  of  1994.  Many  consider  that the OSE lost  trades to 
SIMEX,  in part, because  of the high cost of transactions on the OSE, 
including transactions tax, commissions,  and margin requirements. For 
example,  between  1990 and 1991,  the OSE raised its margin require- 
ment from 15 percent to 30 percent (in three increments),  while SIMEX 
lowered  its  margin requirement from  12 percent to  8.8  percent.  The 
OSE's  30 percent margin requirement was maintained through the next 
two years; the SIMEX margin requirement was raised to  14.2  percent 
in 1992,  but had been cut back to 8.5  percent by August  1993. 
Each change  in margin requirements in SIMEX was preceded by a 
change  in return volatility  in the same direction  (lower  volatility  pre- 
ceded  a lower  margin requirement,  and vice  versa),  whereas  the  in- 
counted  even if it is transacted  abroad.  There  is little evidence  that  Tokyo-based  investors 
have shifted  transactions  to London  from  Tokyo because  of costs. The increase  in SEAQ 
transactions  may be understood  in terms of increased European  interest in Japanese 
stocks and  the convenience  of making  transactions  in local time. Indeed,  the increase  of 
foreign investors  relative  to Japanese  investors  is apparent  from the increasing  share  of 
trade  by foreigners  on the TSE. 
48.  The number  of foreign companies  listed on the TSE decreased  from 125 at the 
end of 1991 to 97 in mid-1994. Since 1993, several Chinese, Korean, and Indonesian 
companies  have chosen to be listed on the NYSE instead of the TSE. Some analysts 
believe that since Japanese  households  have a high propensity  to save, Tokyo should 
attract  firms seeking investment  funds. The fact that foreign firms are delisting and 
choosing not to be listed is seen as evidence that Tokyo is losing its competitive  edge 
as a major  capital  center. 
49.  This discussion summarizes the arguments  of International  Monetary Fund 
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creases  in  Osaka's  margin  requirement  were  not  associated  with 
changes in volatility.50 In fact, changes in the OSE margin requirements 
seem  to have  been  motivated  by concern  about speculative  activities 
that apparently contributed to the decline  in the level  of stock indexes 
(both cash and futures). It was suspected that speculation in the futures 
market and futures-cash  arbitrage had caused  the sharp decline  in the 
cash market. In 1991,  with stock prices declining,  the Japanese regu- 
latory  agencies  became  concerned  about a further fall  in prices  and 
adopted several measures to raise the costs  of transactions in the cash 
and futures markets, including  increasing the margin requirement.5' 
Nevertheless,  raising  the margin requirement clearly  cost  the OSE 
business.52 The financial industry is commonly  thought to be a growth 
industry. If regulations  are too restrictive and the costs  of transactions 
are too high,  the industry will  be stifled and businesses  driven away to 
exchanges  abroad.  Although  not conclusive,  there is  some  evidence 
that the  collapse  of  the  bubble  (specifically,  declining  stock  prices) 
forced  the imposition  of tighter regulations  and higher costs,  contrib- 
uting  to  the  decline  in  the  volume  of  business  on  the  Japanese  ex- 
changes.  The volume  of  transactions in Euro yen interest rate futures 
on SIMEX was only 5.6  percent of the volume  on the TIFFE in 1990, 
but had grown to 26.7  percent in the first half of  1996.  Alarmed by this 
development,  the TIFFE plans to increase trading by one hour, effective 
November  1996. 
Distribution 
The Japanese distribution system is often blamed for its inefficiency 
and for causing  high retail prices.  In vertical keiretsu,  distributors do 
not allow  the goods  of  rival manufacturers to be distributed to group 
retailers.  Multilayer  wholesalers  stifle efficiency.  And the system  in- 
50.  See Ito and Lin (1996). 
51.  Regulations  on cash  markets and futures market were  tightened  four times  be- 
tween  August  1990 and December  1991.  In addition to raising margins,  the authorities 
narrowed the trigger for a circuit  breaker and increased  the period of  time  out after a 
circuit breaker had been  activated.  Additional  measures  adopted in February and June 
1992 forced large traders to disclose  their positions  and trading records on futures and 
options. 
52.  See Ito and Lin (1996). Takatoshi  Ito  245 
cludes  many  small-scale  retailers  who  cannot  realize  economies  of 
scale.53 Distribution  was a source of trade conflict  between  Japan and 
the United  States,  especially  during the negotiations  for the Structural 
Impediments Initiative (SII) in 1989-90.  The United States argued that 
the fact that Japan has few large-scale  retail stores, which tend to carry 
more imported goods than smaller stores,  hurts firms seeking to export 
to Japan. Critics pointed, in particular, to Japan's large-scale retail store 
law,  which restricted the network expansion  of department stores,  dis- 
count stores,  and retail franchises. 
Under that law as it stood in 1991,  the construction of a large-scale 
retail store had to be approved by a specially  designated  local council, 
and the council  would not do so without the consent  of small stores in 
the immediate vicinity  of the site.  Since  smaller family  stores are typ- 
ically  afraid of competition  from large stores,  the council  did not give 
its permission  easily.  In addition,  the council  had authority to impose 
conditions  on  the  proposed  store  in  four  respects:  date  of  opening; 
number of annual holidays (no store can operate 365 days a year); hours 
of business  (no store can operate 24 hours a day; typically,  a large store 
had to close  by 7 p.m.);  and floor space. 
Partly as a result of  the pressure from the United  States at the SII 
talks, the Japanese government modified the approval procedure for the 
construction  of  large-scale  retail  stores  in  1991  and revised  the  law 
accordingly in 1992. The council was abolished,  and the procedure was 
greatly  simplified.  The  number of  large-scale  retail  stores  has  been 
growing  since  1992,  despite  the fact that the total value of retail sales 
was declining  in the aftermath of the bubble.54 Competition at the retail 
level  has  helped  to  prevent  retail prices  from rising,  and sometimes 
even  to lower  them.  Since  new  stores,  especially  discount  stores,  are 
not sampled in the consumer price survey,  it is likely that the consumer 
price index,  the rate of increase of which declined  from 1.6 percent in 
1992 to  -0.  1 percent in 1995,  has in fact been biased upward in recent 
years.  Large-scale  retail  stores  are finally  becoming  popular  in  the 
53.  For details  and statistics,  see Ito (1992,  ch.  13). 
54.  Average  sales of large-scale  retail stores were increasing by 6 to 7 percent from 
1988 to  1990.  The  annual growth rate of  sales  dropped to 4 percent in  1991  and then 
became  negative:  -2  percent in  1992,  -5  percent  in  1993,  and  -2  percent in  1994 
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suburban communities  of metropolitan cities  in Japan, although it will 
take some time for them to become  as common  as those in the United 
States.55 
Agriculture and Land Use 
Although  prices  in Tokyo  are almost universally  higher than those 
in  New  York  or London,  housing  costs  (both  the  purchase  price  of 
housing  and rents) probably present the most striking comparison.  As 
a result of the higher housing costs,  the floor space available to a typical 
family  is much smaller in Japan. Many of the problems that contribute 
to higher housing prices have been identified,  including excessive  pro- 
tection of tenant rights, restrictive zoning laws and restriction on build- 
ing heights,  high capital gains taxes on housing,  and the bequest taxa- 
tion  system.56  During  the  period  of  the  bubble,  the  government 
effectively  increased the capital gains tax by suspending the carry-over 
of capital gains of owner-occupied  residential properties and increasing 
the  tax  rate on  short-term holdings.  It also  introduced  a system  for 
approving  land  transactions  and  imposed  price  ceilings.  And  it  re- 
stricted the sale of government  land, especially  from the formerly na- 
tional railways.  All of the measures were ostensibly  taken to discourage 
speculation.  However,  they also restricted the supply of land, discour- 
aged  transactions,  and made  the  market thin.  After  the  bubble  had 
collapsed,  the  price  ceilings  were  effectively  lifted,  and the  sale  of 
government  land was  permitted again.  The high rate of  capital  gains 
taxation on real estate remains,  however. 
One  important constraint  on  supply  that contributes  to  high  land 
prices  is the continued  existence  of plots of agricultural land in prime 
suburban areas of Tokyo  and other metropolitan cities.  In terms of the 
allocation  of  resources,  this makes  no sense.  It has been  argued that 
these  anomalies  have  been preserved  because  real estate  and bequest 
taxes  on  agricultural land are low,  even  under residential  zoning.  In 
1991 the law was revised  to restrict the definition of agricultural land 
for the purposes  of  real estate  and bequest  taxation under residential 
55.  Admittedly,  the difficulties  of opening a large-scale  retail store and the restric- 
tions on days and  hours  of operation  in Japan  are  probably  comparable  to those in France 
and Germany. 
56.  See Ito (1992, pp. 421-26). Takatoshi  Ito  247 
and commercial  zoning.  Basically,  once land is designated  as agricul- 
tural,  neither the present owner  nor his  beneficiaries  can change  the 
designation  without penalty. This revision has forced the conversion  of 
some land, but the rest is virtually locked in as agricultural land. After 
the revision  went  into effect,  about one-third of  the agricultural land 
plots in the Tokyo area were confirmed as such, while two-thirds were 
taxed as residential and commercial land. It remains to be seen whether 
the change in the law will force enough urban "agricultural"  land onto 
the  residential  and commercial  land  markets  to  lower  overall  land 
prices.  One issue that deserves more debate is the high capital gains tax 
on real estate that, on one hand, alleviates  income inequity arising from 
windfalls  to land owners,  but on the other, prolongs the inefficient  use 
of land. 
The East Asian Miracle 
The increase in trend  growth  rates among  the East Asian economies 
during the past two decades  is reminiscent  of the Japanese experience 
in the  1950s  and  1960s.  So,  too,  are the rapid structural changes  in 
industry, and several social and economic  indicators. How similar have 
the  experiences  of  East  Asia  and Japan actually  been?  This  section 
describes economic  development  in East Asia and draws parallels with 
the Japanese experience.  First, it identifies characteristics that are com- 
mon to the successful  Asian countries.  Second,  it discusses  similarities 
and differences  among the East Asian countries and between East Asian 
countries and Japan. Third, it offers lessons  from the Japanese experi- 
ence for East Asian economies  that are rapidly approaching a level  of 
development  at which they might be vulnerable to the difficulties  that 
Japan has faced since the mid-1980s. 
Growth 
The four most  prominent East Asian  economies-Korea,  Taiwan, 
Hong Kong,  and Singapore-started  to grow rapidly in the mid- 1970s, 
and others-Thailand,  Indonesia,  and Malaysia-followed  suit in the 
1980s.  China started to grow fast in the late  1980s.  Figure 5 plots the 
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Figure  5. Relative  Per Capita GDP,  Selected East Asian Countries,  1950-92a 
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Source: Data on nominal per capita GDP for the East Asian countries are from International  Monetary Fund, Initerniationlal 
Financial Statistics (Septenmber  1996) (available on CD-ROM); and for the United States, from the Economtlic  Report of thle 
Presidetnt,  1996.  All values are converted into U.S. dollars by using the purchasing  power parity  exchange rates found in the 
Penn-World  Tables,  Mark  56,  available  from the worldwide  web page of the National  Bureau  of Economic Research. 
a. Sample periods vary. 
using  the purchasing power parity exchange  rates found in the Penn- 
World Tables) to U.S.  per capita GDP. It shows how, one after another, 
these economies  took off and narrowed the gap with the United States. 
It is clear that the levels  of per capita income  converge. 
The growth experience  of these economies  is reminiscent of Japan's 
experience  a decade  earlier,  also  shown  in the figure.  In all of  these 
cases,  at some point in time the economy  starts to grow very fast (that 
is,  at an annual rate exceeding  7 percent) and it maintains that level  of 
growth for a decade or more. Japan followed  this path in the 1950s and 
1960s; Korea, Hong Kong,  Taiwan,  and Singapore did so in the 1980s; 
and Malaysia,  Thailand,  Indonesia,  and China  seem  to  be  doing  so 
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Table  4. Share of Agriculture  in GDP, Selected East Asian Countries,a 
Postwar  Period 
Threshold  Year in which agriculture fell  below threshold share of total production 
share  Japanb  Korea  Thailand  Malaysiac  Indonesia  China  Philippines 
30 percent  ...  1967  1967  1964  1976  1984  Before 1960d 
20 percent  1956  1978  1982  1983  1991  1992  ... 
10 percent  1963  1989  1988  ..  .  ...  ...  ... 
Source: The World Bank's CD-ROM World  Data 1995 and, for Japan before 1960, Ohkawa and Shinohara (1979). 
a. Each country experienced a secular decline in the production share of agriculture over the sample period. Hong Kong 
and Singapore are not included because agriculture's share has never been above 10 percent in either country. 
b. Japan's agriculture share has been below 30 percent throughout the postwar period. 
c.  Data on Malaysia are not available after 1984. 
d. In the Philippines, agriculture's share has been between 20 and 30 percent since  1960, when data become available. 
Both  the  sudden  increase  in rates of  growth  and the geographical 
proximity of these countries caught the attention of economists.  Many 
have investigated  the possible  causes of such rapid growth in this par- 
ticular set of countries during this period. Cross-country regressions  of 
growth rates as a function  of initial conditions,  such as economic  and 
social  variables in a base year, typically  fail to predict the exceptional 
performance  of  the East Asian  economies.57  In this  light,  their high 
growth rates are miraculous.  However,  there are insights  to be gained 
from the important similarities  and differences  that appear among the 
high-performing  East Asian  economies,  as  well  as  between  each  of 
these and Japan. 
Structural Changes  in Industry 
As  was  the  case  in Japan,  the East Asian  economies  experienced 
rapid structural changes  in industry and exports.  For countries without 
significant resources,  like most East Asian economies,  including Japan 
and Korea, successful  growth requires industrialization,  which enables 
them to produce and export more of the manufactured goods that are in 
demand in world markets. Hence changes in agricultural and industrial 
output shares can serve as benchmarks of economic  development. 
Table 4 shows  how  selected  economies  have reduced the shares of 
their agricultural sectors in GDP over the past thirty years, by indicating 
the year in which that share fell below various thresholds. (For example, 
in Korea the  ratio of  agriculture  to  output fell  below  20  percent  in 
1978.)  The decline  in agriculture seems  to be a good  indicator of  in- 
57.  See, for example, Easterly  (1995) and  Barro  and Sala-i-Martin  (1995). 250  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
dustrialization and rapid growth. The notable exceptions  are Hong Kong 
and Singapore,  which  have never had substantial agricultural sectors. 
These  economies  started  as  commercial  entrepots  and  then  became 
producers  themselves.  Their  transformation  was  from  commerce  to 
manufacturing. 
The changing  product composition  of exports is another marker of 
rapid growth.  Typically,  countries that had traditionally exported pri- 
mary commodities  shifted,  first, to exporting textiles  and simple (light) 
industrial products. In the next stage,  production and exports shifted to 
more sophisticated goods,  such as machinery, steel,  and automobiles.58 
Table 5 shows the share of machinery in exports for selected  countries. 
Machinery exceeded  30 percent of exports in 1983 in Korea and Sing- 
apore, in 1987 in Taiwan,  and in 1989 in Malaysia.  Again Hong Kong 
stands  out:  its  machinery  share crossed  20  percent  in  1979,  but has 
never risen to the next level.  The patterns in output and export imply 
that these East Asian economies  (excepting  Hong Kong)  are repeating 
Japan's pattern of economic  development. 
Balassa-Samuelson  in East Asia 
The experience  of the East Asian economies  and Japan can be viewed 
against predictions  about growth and real exchange  rates based on the 
Balassa-Samuelson  model.  If productivity  growth is faster in tradable 
sectors (mainly manufacturing) than in nontradables, the price of man- 
58.  This pattern of industrial sequencing  is sometimes  called the flying geese  pattern, 
after the shapes  of  the time  series  for imports,  domestic  production,  and exports  of  a 
given  commodity.  First,  the commodity  is  imported (imports  rise);  then,  as domestic 
industry becomes  competitive,  possibly  as a result of  government  targeting,  domestic 
production of the commodity  begins  (imports decline,  domestic  production rises);  sub- 
sequently,  domestic production exceeds  domestic consumption,  and the country becomes 
a net exporter of the commodity  (exports rise); however,  when goverment policy  shifts 
to target another industry,  domestic  production falls  (domestic  production and exports 
decline).  For an example  of  such  a graph,  see  Ito  (1992,  p.  26).  This  idea  was  first 
developed  by Akamatsu (1961);  for a summary of the subsequent literature, see Ohkawa 
and Kohama  (1989;  p.  12).  In the recent Japanese literature,  the flying  geese  pattern 
characterizes  the  "vertical  division  of  labor"  that is developing  in the region  as other 
East Asian  economies  follow  Japan's  pattern of  industrial development:  the  most  ad- 
vanced  nation  in the region  (Japan) exports  sophisticated  parts,  goods,  and services; 
middle-income  countries engage  in assembly  of sophisticated  products or mass produc- 
tion of  less  sophisticated  products; and low-income  countries  engage  in highly  labor- 
intensive  production.  The  validity  and universality  of  this  hypothesis  have  not  been 
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Table 5.  Share  of Machinery  in Exports,  Selected  East Asian  Countries,a 
Postwar  Period 
Year in which machinery rose above threshold share of total exports 
Threshold  Hong 
share  Japanb  Singapore  Korea  Taiwan  Malaysia  Kong  Thailand 
20 percent  .  .  .  1973  1978  1973  1986  1979  1991 
30 percent  ...  1983  1983  1987  1989  ...  ... 
40 percent  1969  1985  1992  1992 
50 percent  1976  1992 
60 percent  1984 
Source: The World Bank's CD-ROM World  Data 1995. 
a. Indonesia and the Philippines are not included because the export share of machinery has never risen above 20 percent 
in either country. 
b. Japan's machinery share has been above 30 percent throughout the postwar period. 
ufactured output will  fall relative to a broad index like the CPI. Since 
manufacturing  productivity  growth  is  especially  rapid  in  the  high- 
growth  economies,  as  nominal  exchange  rates  respond  to  tradables 
prices,  the real exchange  rate (measured as the nominal rate adjusted 
by CPIs) will  appreciate. Under these conditions,  rapid growth will  be 
correlated with real exchange  rates.59 Figure 6 shows  the relationship 
between  growth  and the real exchange  rate for the East Asian  coun- 
tries in  1980-95,  and also for Japan during its period of rapid growth, 
1965-80.  The  newly  industrializing  economies  (NIEs)-Korea,  Tai- 
wan,  Singapore,  and Hong  Kong-do  exhibit  the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect.  But others do not. 
Moreover,  analysis  of  the behavior  of  tradables and nontradables 
prices in these economies  yields  several interesting findings.60 Two,  in 
particular, are noted here. First, in some of the economies  that do not 
follow  the Balassa-Samuelson  path, the;  price of nontradables relative 
to tradables does  not clearly increase over time.  Singapore is a promi- 
59.  Sachs  and Warner (1995b)  and Sachs  (1996)  emphasize  the importance of  the 
resource allocation  in development.  If a country is endowed  with natural resources,  as 
many Latin American countries are, then its comparative advantage will lead the country 
to specialize  in agriculture and it will  experience  slow  growth.  But if a country is not 
endowed with natural resources,  as is often the case in East Asia,  manufacturing export- 
led  growth  may  result.  In the  latter instance,  prices  of  nontradables tend  to  increase 
relative to those of tradables, because  resources are concentrated in manufacturing,  and 
the real exchange  rate appreciates.  Sachs  and Warner (1995a)  find that "openness," 
which to some extent serves as a proxy for economic  reform in general, is a key indicator 
of rapid economic  development. 
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Figure 6. Real Exchange  Rate Changes  and Growth  Relative  to the United States, 
Selected  East Asian Countries,  1980-95 
Annual real exchange rate change (percent)a 
Japanc 
4  Japan  0  Singapore 
0 
2  H  K  Taiwan  2 
~~~~~~~Hong  Kong 
Tawa 
0  ~~~~Korea 
0 
Philippines  0  Thailand 
-2  *Malaysia 
0  Indonesia  China 
-40 
I  I  I  1.  1  1  1 
-2  0  2  4  6 
Relative growth rate (percentage point difference)b 
Source:  Author's  calculations.  Data on GDP for the United States are from the Ecotnottmic  Report of the President, 1996. GDP 
and nominal  exchange rate data for East Asian countries  and CPI data for all countries  (used to calculate  real exchange rates) are 
from International  Monetary  Fund,  International  Financial Statistics (September 1996) (available  on CD-ROM). 
a. Calculated  as 100 x  average  annual  change in the natural  log of an index that is constructed  so that 1990 = 1. 
b. Per capita  GDP growth  rate:  given country  less United States. 
c. 1965-80. 
nent example.  In these countries,  sectors that are classified  as nontrad- 
able are, in fact, efficient  and experience  productivity growth. Second, 
there is a drift in tradables prices denominated in a common currency, 
suggesting  that the law of one price for tradables does not hold for many 
countries.  In Japan and Singapore,  for  example,  prices  of  tradables 
steadily  increased relative to those of their trading partners. If techno- 
logical  advance is achieved not by expanding the volume of production 
but by making higher quality products,  the change  in quality will  not 
be  captured in  the  usual  statistics.  Therefore  this  effect  will  not  be 
picked up by the Balassa-Samuelson  hypothesis  using aggregate data. 
Real exchange  rate movement can vary for different stages of devel- 
opment in a given country. As noted above,  Japan's real exchange  rate 
actually  fell  when  the growth rate picked  up in the  1930s.  The  very 
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economy may require a moderate  real depreciation. If a developing 
country's manufacturing  sector is not as sophisticated  as those of the 
leading countries, a depreciation  of its currency  can boost sales and 
output, thus helping the economy. Once Japan's  manufacturing  indus- 
tries had reached  the technological level of the leading economies and 
achieved a certain share of the world market, further technological 
progress increased  the quality of products, rather  than the volume. If 
such effects in progressive  stages of development  are universal, some 
of the East Asian countries  that  have recently  experienced  high growth 
may soon experience real appreciation  of the currency. 
A Model for Development in East Asia 
The geographical  and  cultural  proximity  of the successful East Asian 
economies inevitably raises hopes that identifying  common charcteris- 
tics will yield a formula  for growth. High saving, high investment, and 
export  promotion  are  the characteristics  most often cited in this context. 
At first  glance, Japan  and  the NIEs do share  many  common  traits.  They 
are  poor in natural  resources  and densely populated.  They share  a Con- 
fucian tradition.  Their  populations  are  highly educated  and saving rates 
are high. Exports  have served as the engine for increased  growth. And 
in all except Hong Kong, the government  has intervened  in the market 
to help industrialization,  leading many economists to observe that the 
NIEs are emulating  Japan's  industrial  policy. 
However, these economies have many  distinctive features  as well as 
similarities. For example, while Korea's industrial  structure  is domi- 
nated  by large industrial  conglomerates  (the Korean  chaebol is similar 
to the Japanese keiretsu), in Taiwan, small businesses predominate. 
Japan did not rely on foreign capital for investment, whereas Korea 
borrowed  so heavily from abroad  that, in the early 1980s, it was one 
of the most indebted  countries, though  by the end of the decade it had 
managed to reduce its liability through growth and current account 
surpluses. Financial institutions in Taiwan are government owned, 
while in Korea financial institutions  are private and have strong con- 
nections with large companies in the chaebol. 
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then suggest how the East Asian experience may be understood  in the 
framework  of development  economics and the new growth  theory. 
Similarities  among East Asian Countries 
As emphasized  above, the patterns  of industrial  structural  changes, 
manifested  in output  shares  of different  sectors and in exports, seem to 
suggest some similarities  in the process of industrialization.  First, in- 
creases in the share  of exports in GDP and increases  in the investment 
rate  are common  to the successful East Asian economies. Since growth 
comes from  capital-intensive  industries,  a high investment  rate  is almost 
axiomatic. The prominence of exports is examined below. High in- 
vestment  must  be accompanied  by high domestic saving, unless foreign 
capital  comes in to fill the gap. Capital  inflows (or equivalently,  current 
account  deficits) must be carefully managed  so that  they do not trigger 
sudden  outflows of capital. 
Another  strength  of the successful East  Asian economies is their  high 
levels of human  capital. Casual  observation  and  the few internationally 
standardized  tests that exist suggest that the school systems of Korea 
and Singapore, as well as Japan, are producing students with better 
basic skills for the same number  of years of education  than  those in the 
United States. In addition, macroeconomic  stability, marked  by low 
inflation  and  low government  deficits, political  stability, and  a relatively 
equal income distribution,  have all contributed  to growth  in East Asia. 
Export Promotion 
In all of the high-growth economies of East Asia, the volume of 
exports has grown rapidly  and the composition  of exports  has changed 
significantly over a short period.6'  The East Asian success in exports 
is  not just a market outcome of  industrialization,  but the result of 
government  promotion. The Japanese  experience in export promotion 
has been studied extensively, as has experience in East Asia, Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore, where export  promotion  policies targeted  cer- 
tain industries.62 
61.  In fact, the World  Bank identifies  exports as the key to the success of the East 
Asian economies (World  Bank, 1993). 
62.  For example, on export promotion  in Japan, see Itoh and others (1988), Ito 
(1992; ch.  7),  and Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura  (1984); and on the East Asian 
countries, see Amsden (1989), Noland (1990), Young (1992), and  Westphal  (1990). Takatoshi  Ito  255 
In Korea,  thirteen  items, including  silk, cotton, radios, and  electrical 
goods, were targeted  as exports  in 1965, and  the list was later  expanded. 
Over the next three decades, the composition  of exports  changed  radi- 
cally, from simple manufactured  goods to heavy goods and  electronics. 
Targeted  industries  received direct  tax incentives  and  subsidies, as well 
as policy loans. It is estimated  that these direct and indirect  subsidies 
were large enough to cancel out the adverse effect of currency  over- 
valuation  in the late 1960s.63  Targets  for export  values were set for each 
commodity and export activity was closely monitored  by the govern- 
ment. Achievement in exporting  was rewarded  by further  incentives. 
Taiwan successfully implemented  an export-oriented  industrial  pol- 
icy only after its import  substitution  program  had failed in the 1950s. 
From the 1960s,  the government introduced measures to promote 
exports and target industries, including free-trade  zones, preferential 
loans, tax exemptions, and tax holidays. Although some import pro- 
tection was maintained  until the mid-1980s, the list of items remained 
short. Banks are state owned and provide capital to serve policy 
objectives. 
Singapore  also tried  import  substitution,  in the 1960s, and  its failure 
led to policy reform that stressed exports. The Development Bank of 
Singapore  provided  loans to targeted  companies  and held their shares, 
with emphasis on the electrical machinery  and petroleum  products  in- 
dustries.64  Singapore, in contrast to Korea, also encouraged inward 
foreign direct investment. Moreover, the government  refrained  from 
regulating  the behavior of multinational  firms in such matters  as the 
repatriation  of profits and local content of products. Tax incentives, 
such as tax holidays, were introduced  in 1967. Foreign firms (those 
with more than 50 percent  foreign equity) accounted  for 82 percent  of 
Singapore's  manufacturing  exports in 1984. 
The East  Asian countries  reviewed  here succeeded  at rapid  economic 
growth  mainly as a result of expanding  exports. This is not surprising. 
An industry  with large economies of scale must expand into foreign 
63.  Westphal  ( 1990) estimates  that  benefits  amounted  to more  than  8 percent  of total 
merchandise  exports, while currency  was overvalued by about 9 percent. Hence he 
argues that, except in infant industries, exports were encouraged  through "neutral" 
policies, in that they were characterized  by "the absence of differential  effects on the 
allocation  of resources  among activities relative to the putative  circumstances  of per- 
fectly free trade" (p. 45). 
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markets  if domestic markets  are small. And a resource-poor  country 
must develop industries  that can produce successful exports, in order 
to finance its growing needs for imports without incurring  too much 
debt. To this end, it is desirable  to choose products  with high income 
elasticities, so that  exports  will grow with the incomes of the importing 
countries, and to technologically upgrade  exporting  industries. 
One reason  for the success of export  promotion,  as opposed  to import 
substitution  or other types of industrial  policy, is related to product 
quality.65  In any government  intervention,  monitoring  quality is a dif- 
ficult task. Without competition or judgment in the market, it is hard 
to evaluate the efforts of producers.  The quality of exports is judged 
abroad. In the case of import substitution, domestic consumers and 
users are captive customers  and producers  may not have incentives to 
improve quality. Admittedly, there are both theoretical  and empirical 
grounds for criticizing export promotion. Vested interests could take 
control of the initiative, and the wrong industries  could be targeted. 
Ultimately, its success should be compared  to that of an alternative 
policy. In this light, it seems difficult to argue  that industrialization  in 
Korea, Taiwan, or Singapore could have been better without export 
promotion. 
Deciding which industries  to promote  might seem a serious  problem. 
However, it is not difficult  for a developing country  to pick an industry 
that  is losing competitiveness  in countries  that  are slightly further  along 
in terms  of economic development  but have similar  factor  endowments 
and economic environments.  Regional development, whether  in nine- 
teenth century Europe or in Asia in the 1980s, benefits from market 
pressure  and lessons learned  from neighboring  countries. 
Differences  among East Asian Countries 
Although there are abundant  similarities in economic structure  and 
industrial  policy between East Asian countries, there are also some 
major differences. For example, unlike Japan, many Asian countries 
were not successful at targeting industries for import substitution. 
Moreover, patterns  of development (such as changes in the industrial 
structure  or the composition of exports) in Hong Kong and Singapore 
differ from those in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. And some East Asian 
65.  See World  Bank (1993). Takatoshi  Ito  257 
countries  seem to have skipped  various  stages of the industrial  sequenc- 
ing that was common to Japan and Korea. Malaysia and Singapore 
succeeded in attracting  foreign firms  with high technology without  de- 
veloping textiles or light industries. 
In addition, different countries have financed growth in different 
ways. Although  Singapore  and Malaysia  have high saving rates  to sup- 
port their high rates of investment,  at times other countries have 
achieved  high investment  rates  by borrowing  from  abroad.  In the 1950s, 
when Japan  was investing in its manufacturing  sectors, it had neither 
international  capital markets nor institutional investors to draw on. 
Instead,  Japan  relied  on domestic  saving  to supply  funds  for investment. 
By contrast, in the 1980s and 1990s growth can be financed through 
foreign direct investment and borrowing  from abroad, thus making it 
possible to accelerate the process. This has substantially  altered the 
dynamics  of financing  growth. On the one hand,  emerging  market  econ- 
omies have the option of borrowing  from abroad  to finance domestic 
investment;  but on the other, they will face financial  difficulties  if their 
external  debts become too large. External  debts eventually have to be 
repaid, or at least stabilized as a share of GDP, if not at an absolute 
level. Japan's  experience with promoting  domestic saving may not be 
a precondition  for growth. Thailand  has a low saving rate despite its 
high investment  rate. And Korea, as noted  above, had  one of the highest 
external  debt ratios in East Asia in the early 1980s. 
Furthermore,  while in Korea and Taiwan  the manufacturing  sectors 
have become strong, as they did earlier  in Japan,  the strengths  of Hong 
Kong and Singapore  lie in their  efficient and competitive  financial  sec- 
tors. Theoretical  and  empirical  analyses  have typically treated  financial 
services as nontradables.  Given that Singapore and Hong Kong have 
grown as a result of their roles as the financial centers of Asia, this 
categorization  may not be correct.  The volume  of financial  transactions, 
including  foreign exchange and futures  contracts, has grown faster in 
these markets  than in most others in the world: Singapore and Hong 
Kong rank  fourth  and fifth, respectively, in foreign exchange  turnover, 
after the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan, according  to 
the 1995 triennial  survey of the Bank for International  Settlements.66 
Finally, in economies with less efficient securities markets, such as 
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Japan, banks are the main intermediaries,  whereas other economies, 
such as Malaysia, have highly active stock markets. 
These differences have two interesting  implications. First, some of 
these economies, especially those that develop strong  and competitive 
service, distribution,  and  transport  sectors, may not experience  the real 
appreciation suggested by  the traditional Balassa-Samuelson-type 
model. Second, Singapore  and  Hong Kong, possibly to be followed by 
Korea  and  Taiwan, may overtake  Japan  in the transformation  to a highly 
productive  service economy. Although  the Japanese  manufacturing  sys- 
tem has been, and still is, widely regarded  as efficient at turning  out 
high-quality, innovative  products,  the service sector, broadly  defined, 
is hardly  cost effective or innovative. 
Lessons from Japan 
The lesson of the Japanese  experiences for the growing East Asian 
countries is two fold. First, the century of Japanese  economic devel- 
opment starting from the 1860s, and especially the period from the 
1950s through  the mid-1980s, is generally regarded  as a success and 
has some positive lessons to offer. Second, Japan's experiences over 
the past ten years-that  is, the bubble in the second half of the 1980s 
and  its collapse and  the subsequent  slow recovery  in the first  half of the 
1990s-offer  some negative lessons. 
Many  of the positive lessons relate  to the general  characteristics  that 
made it possible for the Japanese  economy to catch up so rapidly  with 
the leading industrial  countries  in the 1950s and 1960s. These include 
several features  of the long-term  contracts  that facilitated  quality con- 
trols and innovation  in manufactured  goods and  the excellent education 
system. Japan's  industrial  policy is more  controversial.  In this context, 
it should  be remembered  that  Japan  started  with a largely  planned  econ- 
omy at the end of World  War  II, and  has consistently  reduced  the extent 
of government  intervention  in the economy over the postwar period. 
Tariffs were reduced  step by step. Import  quotas were expanded  grad- 
ually. For example, restrictions  on foreign exchange transactions,  first 
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and rarely  reversed.67  In regard  to industrial  policy, although  the gov- 
ernment  targeted  certain industries  for promotion, it gradually  phased 
out subsidies  over the years, transferring  its support  to others. And even 
in the targeted  industries, several Japanese  firms, sometimes one from 
each of the "big six"  enterprise groups, competed in the domestic 
market  so that firms  felt the pressure  of competition.  This may explain 
the difference between Japan's successful experience with an import 
substitution  strategy  and unsuccessful  experiences of many East Asian 
countries. Finally, Japan's experience suggests that when an export 
growth strategy  is successful, the real exchange rate is likely to appre- 
ciate. When the Balassa-Samuelson  effect is operative, resisting nom- 
inal exchange  rate  appreciation  may result  in serious  domestic  inflation, 
as Japan  found out in 1972-73. 
As for negative lessons, some East Asian economies are at a suffi- 
ciently advanced  stage of development  that they should fear repeating 
the unfortunate  experience of the Japanese  economy in the 1990s. At 
this time, deregulation  and  fostering  competition  for nontradables  seem 
to be the key to raising living standards  in Japan.  Politicians and busi- 
ness leaders of countries  that are riding high on the success of export- 
promoting  manufacturing  sectors may find this logic hard  to accept. 
The recent  real appreciation  of the yen may reflect  rapid  productivity 
growth  in tradable  sectors relative  to that  of nontradable  sectors, as has 
been the case throughout  the rest of the postwar  period. Alternatively, 
it could be that  productivity  growth  in the nontradable  sectors has been 
so slow that real appreciation  occurs without exceptional productivity 
growth  in the tradable  sector. If the latter  is true, as is suspected  in the 
1990s, it is not welfare enhancing; that is,  real appreciation  in fact 
represents  a decline in the standard  of living. 
Japan's experience warns that the possibility of a financial bubble 
increases as the economic growth  rate picks up. If land supply is con- 
strained,  as it is in most East  Asian countries,  an increase  in the demand 
67.  See Ito (1986) for the sequence  of the deregulation  of capital  controls. Outflow 
restrictions  were relaxed during periods when the yen was appreciating,  and inflow 
restrictions  were relaxed  when the yen was depreciating.  It took several  cyclical move- 
ments  of the yen, from  the beginning  of the 1970s to the mid-1980s, to eliminate  capital 
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for real estate will raise real estate prices.68  This can encourage  spec- 
ulation in land, which becomes all the easier if the financial sector is 
deregulated,  as it generally  is when the economy is developing  rapidly. 
Therefore  it is crucial to have a prudential  policy that focuses on the 
risk of nonperforming  loans. The need for such a policy is greater  in 
an economy in which banks dominate  industrial  financing  than one in 
which banks  are less important.  The Japanese  experience  with the bub- 
ble and its collapse provides financial  institutions  with a lesson on the 
importance  of risk management. 
68.  For example, Hong Kong has experienced a rapid increase in both property 
prices and  rents  over the past  decade. The price  of residential  property  doubled  between 
1985 and 1989, and then tripled  between 1989 and 1994. The rent index also doubled 
in the former  period, but increased  by only 70 percent  in the latter. The experience  of 
Tokyo shows that  a price increase  without  an accompanying  increase  in rents  is one sign 
of a bubble. However, Hong Kong's banks  have high capital  ratios and are considered 
to be prudent  in managing  risk. Comments 
David E. Weinstein: Ito provides an extremely interesting  and well- 
executed discussion of the issues facing Japan  and  East Asia. He paints 
a picture  of Japan  as a country  whose development  strategy  worked  for 
years, but  is now faced with the dilemma  of how to become a "normal" 
country;  that  is, not shackled  by the unique  features  of Japanese  political 
economy. Indeed, Ito argues that precisely the institutions  that helped 
Japan  to grow so fast are now preventing  its recovery from recession. 
This suggests the possibility of an East Asian growth  problem:  how can 
other  countries  that  have tried  to follow Japan's  pattern  avoid  the pitfalls 
of its recent experience? 
Ito makes a convincing case. Many of the hallmarks  of Japanese 
development-for  example, corporate  groups, industrial  policy, life- 
time employment,  a rigid  educational  system  that  stresses  memorization 
over creativity, and heavy regulation of nonmanufacturing  sectors- 
seem not to make sense from a Western  point of view, and yet, until 
relatively recently, were seen as necessary. Today they are seen as 
liabilities, but are proving  very hard  to dismantle. Japan  seems impris- 
oned  by the very system  that  gave it prominence.  More  important,  Japan 
is faced with the question of what will it become if-and  this is a big 
if-it  does take the system apart. 
The fundamental  question is which aspects of the Japanese  system 
should  live on and  which should  be cast aside. I start  with the positives. 
It is often argued  that creativity is not stressed in Japanese  education 
after  elementary  school. However, it is important  also to ask how much 
creativity  is stressed  in education  in the United States. The experience 
of most upper-middle-class  children  in high school is by no means the 
norm, and it is worth bearing in mind that for every child in an elite 
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high school in the United States, there are thousands  of students  lan- 
guishing in high schools that are abysmal by Japanese  standards.  In- 
deed, Harold Stevenson and James Stigler demonstrate  compellingly 
that  not only does the average  Japanese  high school student  have better 
math and science ability than the average U.S.  student, but Japanese 
students outperform  their U.S.  counterparts  decile by decile, all the 
way to the top schools.'  While it is  likely that this comparison is 
reversed in college and graduate  school, the fact remains that for the 
60 to 70 percent of children  who do not go beyond secondary  school, 
the Japanese  system  provides  better  training  than  does the United  States. 
Thus, while Ito is correct to note that Japan  needs to put more effort 
into improving  its educational  system, from a comparative  standpoint, 
the United States has more cause for worry. 
A similar argument  can be made about lifetime employment. Ito 
suggests that  slower  Japanese  growth  rates  will tend  to reduce  the ability 
of the lifetime employment system to pay out ever higher wages to 
older workers, for the same reason  that  the U.S. social security  system 
is likely to run into difficulties. However, one could also make an 
argument  for steep wage profiles  and  lifetime employment  independent 
of aging effects. As Ito notes, lifetime employment  stems in large part 
from the fact that  there is very little professional  training  in Japan.  The 
popular  press laments the high number  of lawyers in the United States 
relative to Japan, but as Gary Saxonhouse and Daniel Okimoto point 
out, this is true of most other types of professional  too.2 For example, 
M.B.A.s and Ph.D.s are far more common in the United States than  in 
Japan. Whereas American workers typically become highly skilled 
through schooling, Japanese workers rely far more heavily on their 
firms for training. This helps to account for the far higher degree of 
firm-specific  training  in Japan, as well as for the lifetime employment 
system. Despite this fundamental  structural  difference between Japan 
and the United States, which should act to preserve the system of 
permanent  employment, the Japanese  have been awaiting  the collapse 
of the system since its inception:  even in the 1960s, Japanese  firms  felt 
that it could not survive. Such worries about the future persist, but 
unless radical  educational  reforms  are enacted, I am skeptical whether 
any changes will be important. 
1.  Stevenson  and Stigler (1992). 
2.  Saxonhouse  and Okimoto  (1987). Takatoshi  Ito  263 
Since the Japanese  are only beginning  to add professional  schools to 
their educational  system, it is likely to be a long time before one sees 
anything like the collapse of the permanent  employment system. In- 
deed, the aggregate statistics show that between 1980 and 1994 the 
average age of the Japanese  male worker increased by 2.2 years and 
average  tenure  increased  by 2.0 years. In fact, rates of average  tenure 
have never been higher  in Japan.  Thus, despite anecdotal  evidence that 
individual workers and firms do not want to honor their mutual  com- 
mitments,  rumors  of the demise of lifetime employment  would seem to 
be exaggerated. 
Although certain policies may have contributed  to higher saving, I 
am more skeptical than Ito that Japan's unique institutions  have ever 
really  helped  the country,  and  hence I do not see that  its current  situation 
is inevitable. Consider  the main bank system. Various  studies find that 
the Japanese  firms affiliated with main banks do not exhibit superior 
performance  relative to firms that are not so blessed, regardless of 
whether  performance  is measured  in productivity,  growth, or profits.  If 
this system truly  benefits  firms, one must ask why these benefits  are not 
apparent  in any of the conventional measures of performance.  Simi- 
larly, if the system is so good, why did Japanese  firms  flock to foreign 
markets  for new sources of capital finance  the moment  the government 
permitted  foreign bond issuance? 
Vertical groups and distributional  groups (keiretsu)  can also be ra- 
tionalized in terms of Japanese  tax rates, which confer significant  ben- 
efits on small enterprises.  For example, Japan's  new consumption  tax 
does not apply if purchases  are made from a small retailer.  This policy 
alone gives small retailers  a 3 percent  price advantage  over large stores 
and  helps to prevent  the spread  of large-scale  discount  stores. It is hard 
to make the case that the vast array  of policies designed to help small 
businesses and maintain  vertical groups has ever promoted  efficiency 
in Japan. 
Industrial  policy also seems to have had a questionable  impact on 
Japanese  economic development. Richard  Beason and I show that in- 
dustrial  policy has tended  to draw  resources  out of fast growing sectors 
in manufacturing  and  into slow growing  ones.3 In finance  and  insurance, 
Japanese  industrial  policy has created  a system  in which  the government 
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(in the form of the post office) has become the largest provider of 
banking  and insurance  services not only in the country  but, probably, 
in the world. Regulation  has further  fragmented  Japanese  banking  into 
a host of specialized institutions:  city banks, long-term  credit banks, 
regional banks, agricultural  banks, and so forth. In telecommunica- 
tions, as Ito notes, state-sanctioned  monopolies have led to pricing 
structures  in which calls are billed at large premiums  over marginal 
cost: a far less efficient approach  than the U.S.  system of charging a 
flat rate  for unlimited  local calls. Transportation  is hampered  by truck- 
ing regulation, airline price regulation, and a taxi cartel that makes 
Japanese  cabs phenomenally  expensive by U.S.  standards.  And Japa- 
nese real estate law is hardly a model of efficiency. Given that over 
three-quarters  of Japanese  production  takes place outside manufactur- 
ing, and that it is precisely in these sectors that one finds most of the 
inefficient regulations, it is not hard to argue that a lot of work lies 
ahead if Japan  wants to continue to raise overall productivity  levels. 
Indeed, this sort of regulation helps to explain why the Balassa- 
Samuelson  predictions  hold for the postwar  period  in Japan.  Using data 
from Dale Jorgenson  and Masahiro  Kuroda  on relative levels of total 
factor productivity  (TFP), it is possible to track  the movement  of Jap- 
anese TFP relative to U.S.  TFP.4 These data reveal two important 
phenomena. First, there was a general productivity  slowdown in the 
nonmanufacturing  sectors of both countries. Second, in relative terms, 
this slowdown was more pronounced  in Japan. In other words, while 
the Japanese manufacturing  sector did largely converge to U.S.  pro- 
ductivity levels,  the Japanese nonmanufacturing  sector stopped con- 
verging. 
The productivity  evidence is consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis, in the sense that slower productivity  growth rates in non- 
manufacturing  sectors contributed  to exchange rate appreciation.  The 
standard  version of the Balassa-Samuelson  hypothesis postulates that 
slow growth in services is due to the fact that there is no significant 
difference  between the initial levels of productivity  in the nonmanufac- 
turing  sectors of the two countries.  However, the productivity  evidence 
suggests that there was, in fact, a large productivity  gap in services in 
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the 1960s, but for some reason the nontradables  gap persisted, while 
the gap in tradables  largely disappeared.  The halt in convergence in 
nonmanufacturing  is a major  cause of the appreciation  of the real ex- 
change rate. One plausible explanation for the Japanese economy's 
convergence in manufacturing  but not elsewhere is that services have 
been so highly regulated  as to stifle innovation. 
However, I am not sure how useful it is to search for Balassa- 
Samuelson effects using the real exchange rate data presented  in the 
paper. The Balassa-Samuelson  model is constructed  for a world in 
which one country is growing and the rest are at the steady state. In 
practice, these tests are usually implemented  by looking at a country's 
real exchange rate  relative  to the United States. But is the United States 
the appropriate  base country?  The dollar was overvalued in the early 
1980s and depreciated  dramatically  over the decade. If the U.S. expe- 
rience with growth rates and exchange rates is not representative  of 
developed countries in general, it will tend to shift all of the points in 
one direction. Ito's evidence would have been more convincing if he 
had  related  the exchange rate  performance  of the East Asian economies 
to a representative  basket of developed country  currencies,  rather  than 
to the dollar alone. 
Regardless  of the mechanism  underlying  the Balassa-Samuelson  ef- 
fect, the larger question remains of how Japan moved from being a 
country that many developing countries tried to emulate to being yet 
another  major  economic power in distress. To some degree, Japan  was 
a victim of its own success. In the 1960s, when Japan  was one of the 
first countries to exhibit persistent  double-digit  growth, observers  be- 
lieved that  this phenomenon  was the result  of unique  institutions.  How- 
ever, as other  countries  with very different  institutional  structures  began 
to replicate the Japanese growth experience, it became increasingly 
clear to economists that Japan's  growth probably  had not been due to 
distinctive national  features. 
The problem  is that it has been very hard  for Japanese  policymakers 
to learn  this lesson. For decades, the Japanese  believed that  their  coun- 
try's superior  performance  was due to its superior  institutions. Only 
now are they learning  that  other  economies, with different  institutions, 
can grow at similar rates. Had Japan  not grown quickly in the 1960s, 
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recommending  that  the Japanese  dismantle  many  of the institutions  that 
now appear  inefficient. Instead, rapid growth rates gave the Japanese 
the hubris  to believe that the normal  rules of economics did not apply. 
I would argue that the primary lesson that other Asian countries 
should learn  from  Japan  is that  hubris  about  economic performance  can 
have long-term implications. This self-confidence manifests itself in 
many ways; for example, various Asian leaders have argued that de- 
mocracy and human rights issues are less important  in Asia. When a 
country's economy is growing by 10 percent  a year, virtually  all of the 
goverment's sins are forgivable. But when an economy is not growing, 
the problems  seem far more clear. The key lesson from Japan  seems to 
be: "Do not let high growth  rates  fool you into believing that  economic 
reform  and  liberalization  are  unnecessary,  because it will be much  more 
painful to undertake  political reforms when growth slows." 
A corollary, which one can also draw from Ito's analysis, is that 
there does not appear to be one single model of East Asian growth. 
Some East Asian countries  follow Confucian  traditions,  others  are pre- 
dominantly Muslim; in some, such as Singapore, the government is 
actively interventionist  in the economy, while others, such as Hong 
Kong,  are much closer to laissez-faire capitalism. The bottom line 
seems to be that economies have a wide degree of latitude in accom- 
modating  domestic culture, traditions,  and  institutions  without  sacrific- 
ing overall standards  of living. The evidence suggests that, as long as 
countries  maintain  liberal  trade  and  economic regimes, a few industrial 
policy warts will not tarnish  the beauty of the capitalist system. 
Ito also raises the difficult issues of the role of government  in gen- 
erating  the Japanese  downturn  and the prognosis for the future. I think 
that his analysis of the role of monetary  policy during the bubble is 
plausible, but I would like to comment on his assessment of the prog- 
nosis.  First, I would caution against excessive pessimism regarding 
Japan. Every time the Japanese economy falters, there is a flood of 
arguments  about why Japan  no longer poses a problem. Following the 
oil shock of 1973, Japan's  high growth  era ended. The growth rate of 
nominal GDP per capita sank below that of the United States, and per 
capita  GDP measured  at exchange rates did not differ by much  between 
the two countries. In light of these facts, media pundits  began to pron- 
ounce the beginning of the "no problem  era," when all trade  friction 
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1980s soon followed-a  decade of tremendous  U.S.-Japan trade  con- 
flict. This suggests that one should exercise caution in evaluating the 
current  Japanese situation. While the Japanese  economy is mired in 
recession and the U.S.  economy is in the midst of one of the longest 
periods  of continuous  economic expansion  in history, it is easy to think 
that the debate  has shifted from "Japan  bashing" to "Japan  passing." 
The real test of whether there has been structural  change will come 
when Japan  recovers and the U.S.  economy slips into recession. My 
guess is that U.S.-Japanese relations then may not look so different 
from those of the 1980s. 
I agree with Ito that the Bank of Japan's  policies have exacerbated 
the Japanese  situation  and continue  to do so. The decision to maintain 
a tight monetary  policy in the face of a financial  crisis arising from a 
decline in prices may not be the wisest for the Japanese economy. 
Furthermore,  many  of the antirecessionary  packages, such as temporary 
tax cuts, probably  did little to stimulate the Japanese  economy. And 
the lack of government  action on the bad loans problem  encouraged  the 
uncertainty  in Japanese  financial  markets,  because  financial  institutions 
were hesitant  to make new loans until they had a better  picture  of their 
own financial  situations.  However, it is clear  that  the Japanese  economy 
will recover. The only question is whether  this period of reform will 
stimulate  new growth in nonmanufacturing  sectors. 268  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1996 
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